Journeying Towards America: An Anthropological Inquiry Into What We Think is Real by Freiman, Jonathan
Oberlin 
Digital Commons at Oberlin 
Honors Papers Student Work 
1987 
Journeying Towards America: An Anthropological Inquiry Into 
What We Think is Real 
Jonathan Freiman 
Oberlin College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors 
 Part of the Sociology Commons 
Repository Citation 
Freiman, Jonathan, "Journeying Towards America: An Anthropological Inquiry Into What We Think is Real" 
(1987). Honors Papers. 603. 
https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors/603 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons at Oberlin. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Oberlin. For 
more information, please contact megan.mitchell@oberlin.edu. 
( 
JOURNEYING TOWARDS AMERICA: 
AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO WHAT WE THINK IS REAL 
Jonathan Freiman 
1987 




For my parents, 
my bounders and my creators, 
who have kept the delicate balance 
[T]he fundamental coerciveness of society lies not in its 
machineries of social control, but in its power to constitute 
and to impose itself as reality. 
Peter Berger, The Sacred canopy 
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As Peter Berger said, the definition of reality represents a 
society's most powerful form of control, its cognitive 
straitjacket on creativity. As a member of American culture who 
has more often than not found himself thrown up against the walls 
of reality by the cultural police, I have long found what we call 
reality fascinating. I remember when, after withdrawing from 
college after my freshman year, I began to hear dire warnings 
about the 'real world'. A moment away from the safety net of 
academia, it seemed, and I was about to be plunged into the dark 
abyss of harshness, the teeth-flashing pit of a dog-eat-dog 
world. 
It wasn't that way, of course. I found things I liked 
doing, and none of them were located in that dark pit. But it 
seemed to me that whatever lifestyle I chose, I never entered 
that mythical 'real world'. I moved to Israel and lived on a 
kibbutz, which was acceptable as a digression, but not a way of 
life. Somehow it just didn't count to the people around me as 
'real life'. I took up acting, working as part of a company in 
which people spent their lives, but it too failed to measure up 
to 'real life'. I worked with my parents in their small 
pharmacy, but still, I was miles away from the 'real world'. 
When I returned to academia, the warnings changed. I'd 
better plan for that time not too far away, that childhood's end, 
that entrance into the real world. But I started to express a 
desire to become an academic, to make my life in the world of 
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universities. And once again, in my neck of the woods, eyebrows 
raised in the face of my obstinate refusal to finally become a 
part of the real world. 
Personally, I think everything I've done is real, and my 
confidence in that belief provided the first push towards this 
thesis. Why, I wondered, do we limit what we call 'real'? What 
do we mean by 'real' in the first place? 
I still don't know, but I think I've made a start, and the 
start has been as valuable for me emotionally as it has 
intellectually. I was faced with the cultural cops, our notion 
of reality, and they came down hard. But as Milton Yinger has 
observed, victor Turner has inferred and Neil Postman has 
demanded, good education is itself a subversive activity, the 
analysis and deconstruction of our own social codes and beliefs. 
That insurrection has given me an emotional base from which to 




INTRODUCTION: CHARTING THE JOURNEY 
You have in your hands a thing: a discrete, bounded entity. 
You see paper, which you identify as a thing, and you see some 
concept, 'thesis',less directly than paper, but still as a 
thing. 
But as much as you have a thing, you engage in a process, 
the interaction of my mind and yours, a time-delayed 
conversation. A thesis (or article or book) performs the role of 
an intellectual launching pad, a catalyst for thought. Both 
'realities', the slices of a dead tree and the process-
engagement, confront you through experience. 
And yet, as Americans we are more likely to think of even 
the process elements of a thesis as a thing: a bounded, complete 
set of thoughts ready for dissection. Unless reminded, we allow 
the process to slip into the background. We forget the 
engagement and concentrate on the analysis. I call this paper 
"Journeying Towards America" to emphasize what we sometimes 
forget: that any written work is both a journey shared and a 
place reached, a process of exploring the intricacies of the 
foreign terrain, and a recounting of the things found there. 
In this case, the foreign terrain is not so foreign. I take 
the anthropological col lander to our own soup, and sift through 
our own vegetables. The advantage in all this intimacy, of 
course, is that it's your soup too. You know what I'm not even 
sifting, what I didn't see at the bottom of the pot and what I did. 
My primary vegetable, the big cheese passing through my 
autoanthropological grater, is epistemology, or the way of seeing 
and making sense out of the world. I submit that our tendency to 
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see this thesis as more of a thing than a process ties into a 
distinctly American (or Western) way of seeing the world. Our 
blind spot for process, this half-amnesia of the intellect, 
clusters around our notion of reality. Much of the world, I aim 
to prove, we see through the filter of thinghood, through the 
lens of boundaries and borders, physicality and separateness. 
That thinking, a way of looking at the world I have tagged 
'thing-epistemology', has been associated through the long march 
of history as 'Aristotelian' thinking. Set up against it by our 
duality-loving minds has generally been something called 
'Galilean' thought, a means of understanding that I call 
'process-epistemology'. 
America, of course, and Americans in particular, do not 
locate themselves entirely within an Aristotelian world. 
Elements of process-thinking occasionally seep in, and some 
groups within American society base their philosophic systems on 
process, not thing. 'America' (whatever that means) represents a 
mixed system, a melting pot that separates, a constellation of 
opposites tugging at each other across a self-created divide. 
More often than not, Aristotle wins that tug-of-war, and reality 
appears to us as a thing. 
A thing is, by definition, something bounded, something 
discrete. The world presents itself as an undifferentiated 
stream; it is we who cut and carve, who name, bound and define. 
"This is a man," we say, including saliva in the mouth but 
excluding that just spit our, drawing our man-line around the 
scab but between the foot and the sock, counting a transplanted 
kidney but not a hairpiece. "This is a foot," we say, meaning it 
is not an arm, a leg or a chin, although the four may form one 
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integrated body. "It ends here," we say, "and isn't the same as 
this," 'this' being a second thing. 
Anything that bounds must exclude. As Kenneth Burke once 
said, a way of seeing is a way of not seeing. If I say "this is 
a man" the way I did above, then I leave out spit, sock and 
hairpiece. If I say it in a different way, I could leave out 
skin, soul and history. spit, sock and hairpiece seem 
reasonable exclusions to make because they lie outside our 
culture'sl definition of a man; to leave out skin or soul, which 
our culture doesn't, seems absurd. 
But not absurd to all. A culture may leave spit in its 
definition of a man, or it may leave soul out. The point is not 
to ask whether spit or soul should be included in the definition 
of a man, just to note that different cultures count different 
things. And by counting different things, they leave others out. 
The whole process of defining, of cutting and carving, 
necessarily excludes some concepts and includes some others .. 
That is the essence of thingness. 
To most of my (American) readers, this must seem pure 
sophistry. Of course reality is a thing, as much as anything is 
a thing. But that doesn't mean we think it's a small thing, a 
little picture window on a world obscured by the white walls of 
II have drawn my notion of culture, here and following, from the 
works of Geertz and Witherspoon, particularly "Thick Description" 
and Language and Art in the Navajo Universe. 
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our cultural living room. It's a thing, but it's our concept for 
the whole thing, the big thing, the real thing. 
And that seems plausible. Such is the danger with 
autoanthropology. As one astute observer once remarked, the more 
anthropologists say about America, the less we trust what they 
say about Samoa. Maybe we distrust what we/they say because its 
revelations directly confront our common sense, that variegated 
last-ditch cultural system on which we so often base our actions. 
If the second is true, then the distrust, growing out of 
discomfort, must be seen as a positive indicator of progress, a 
signpost reading "DANGER! CULTURAL ASSUMPTIONS CHALLENGED." 
Since challenging cultural assumptions (or at least pointing them 
out) is the primary business of autoanthropology, we're on the 
right road. 
But doubting anthropology in your own backyard may come from 
boredom as much as it comes from distrust. Discussing American 
conceptions of reality in terms of thinghood just doesn't seem 
like anything special, certainly nothing to spend a hundred pages 
on. But what seems most evident may seem so because most rooted, 
and what is most rooted may be so because most basic. Bateson 
echoes the teachings of Zen Buddhism in saying 
[T]hat which we know best is that of which we are least 
conscious, i.e., that the process of habit formation is a 
sinking of knowledge down to less conscious and more archaic 
levels. the unconscious contains not only the painful 
matters which consciousness prefers to not inspect, but also 
many matters which are so familiar that we do not need to 
inspect them. (1972:141, my emphasis) 
Inspecting familiar matters from an unfamiliar perspective is-
just what I'm after: the analysis of epistemology--our way of 
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seeing and understanding the world--that most basic cultural grid. 
What is most basic, then, may be one of those Witherspoon ian 
cultural keys, central clues to the understanding of a culture. 
Such is the case, I think, with 'reality is a thing'. It seems 
obvious because it is: obvious, but crucial. 
* * * 
That diffent cultures define reality in different terms 
leads not only to the question of how America defines it, but 
also to the question of where cultures get their ideas of 
reality. The terrain here, the connection between reality and a 
culture's conceptions of it, can be tricky. Should I frame the 
question as "Which cultural conception, or which synthesis of 
varying conceptions, comes closest to depicting the world as it 
is?" 
If I do, I must join the philosophers. As I'll show later, 
the phrasing of that question makes it likely that only 
philosophers from certain cultures would ask it at all. Phrasing 
the question like that has also allows philosophically-minded 
politicians a possible justification for imperialism, trumpeting 
as they so often do the virtues of bringing the true god to the 
heathens, or the only real form of freedom to the self-oppressed. 
Since I claim no privileged access to truth, I will avoid 
that phrasing entirely. As close as ethnophilosophy and the 
sociology of knowledge may sometimes come to philosophy, my own 
best interests lie in drawing the line firmly. Philosophy aims, 
like some Cortez of knowledge, to find the fountain of truth; 
anthropology contents itself with charting the paths of those 
varied cultures that seek it, and then documenting in fine detail 
7 
the millions of places where it has been found. 2 The temptation 
to pick the biggest fountain or the brightest or the most 
beautiful and call it the only one is a temptation that 
philosophical anthropologists must always fight. 3 
HOw, then, should I frame the question of the connection 
between reality and cultural conceptions of it? As I said at the 
beginning, cultures differ in their understandings of the 
undifferentiated stream that is the world. That led into a 
discussion of bounding, of cutting and carving. But cutting and 
carving can be seen as creating as easily as they can be seen as 
bounding. A wood sculptor could be said to be constructing 
boundaries, but it could just as easily be said (and more often 
is) that she creates. So too with a culture's view of reality; 
reality is on one hand a bounding of the world that is, on the 
other a new creation. Neither tag, bounder or creator, needs to 
exclude the other, and something can be learned by looking at the 
sculptor in both lights. What we are dealing with in the second 
light is the cultural creation of reality, or as Berger and 
Luckmann once put it, "the social construction of reality." 
2Many trends in modern science, including especially quantum 
physics, indicate that there is no absolute truth except where we 
locate it. Buddhism, Hinduism, information theory, cognitive 
science and neurophysiology all agree to at least some extent. 
3p icking the most beautiful fountain seems to depend in no small 
way on which fountain you grew up under; which cascade of water 
has shed its drops on you for years. And the choice also seems 
not uninfluenced by your compelling motive in looking at the 
other fountain at all: is it to consider purchase or capture, to 
admire or self-affirm by deprecation of a rival, or to create a 




The very notion of a culturally-created reality brings bile 
to the mouths of most American philosophers. 4 G.E.Moore, 
proving the reality of the external world by holding up one 
hand and saying here is a physical object and then holding 
up the other and saying here is another 
is, as Clifford Geertz has noted, "the epitomizing image of a 
very large part of recent philosophy" (1983:77). More broadly, 
culturally-created reality as a concept rubs most Americans, 
philosophers or not, the wrong way. "Look, reality just is," 
you're likely to hear when you ask an American if culture creates 
reality. Reality is undeliberated on. It is assumed, or even 
more directly, un-assumed, for the very act of assumption half-
implies a fleeting recognition of the assuming. 
In its taken-for-grantedness, the acceptance of reality 
parallels common sense. As Geertz remarks, 
it is an inherent characteristic of common-sense thought 
precisely to deny [that it is a relatively organized body of 
considered thought] and to affirm that its tenets are 
immediate deliverances of experience, not deliberated 
reflections upon it ... common sense rests its [case] on the 
assertion that it is not a case at all, just life in a 
nurshell. The world is its authority. (1983:75) 
Whether common sense models its unassumednes on the unassumedness 
of reality or the unassumedness of reality grows from common 
sense's 'no questions' approach, the two styles converge. Just 
as common sense is an organized cultural system masquerading as 
direct experience, our dominant definition of reality claims to 
be reality itself. 
4w-no are, of course, part of the culture under study, the one 
that dictates (too strong a word?) objective truth. 
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Of course not all of our culture denies the cultural 
createdness of reality. Quantum physicists, for instance, often 
find themselves defending the human createdness of reality 
against less-than-accepting philosophers and theologians, 
although they do so without recourse to the word 'culture'. 
Theater, for its part, often questions the taken-for-grantedness 
of reality, as do poetry, science fiction, and a wide cross-
section of the arts. Much of academia also embraces the idea of 
a culturally- (or humanly-) created reality, from deconstructing 
literary theorists to symbol-wielding neurophysiologists. As 
Chapter 4 will show, this belief in the cultural creation of 
reality may represent the core of the process-epistemology, the 
organizing principle and common bond around which many of 
America's counterepistemologies collect. 
* * * 
But why should we assume the opinion of the second group, 
the actors and artists, physicists and poets, when it comes to 
the question of the cultural creation of reality? Why not accept 
what I paint to be the dominant American picture, the opposition 
to the notion of a culturally-created reality? 
The answer lies in our own bodies. As Emerson once said, 
overstating, "The whole of nature is a metaphor of the human 
mind." A large body of literature has grown up around humanity's 
seeming need for external creations. As Peter Berger puts it, 
"Human being is externalizing in its essence and from the 
beginning" (1967:4). The need for externalization, noted by 
Spencer, Hegel and Marx, has recently been attributed to human 
physiology (Gehlen, Plessner, Buytendijk, Portmann, Lapassade, 
10 
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cited in Berger). Berger summarizes the field by saying 
essential steps in the process of 'finishing' man's 
development, which have already taken place in the foetal 
period for the higher mammals, occur in the first year after 
birth in the case of man. That is, the biological process 
of 'becoming man' occurs at a time when the human infant is 
in interaction with an extra-organismic environment ... thus a 
biological foundation to the process of 'becoming man' 
occurs at a time when the human infant is in interaction 
with an extra-organismic environhment ... thus a biological 
foundation to the process of 'becoming man' in the sense of 
developing personality and appropriating culture. The 
latter developments are not somehow superimposed as alien 
mutations upon the biological development of man, but they 
are grounded in it. (1967:4-5) 
culture does not wait for biology to develop, as the 
Enlightenment view held. The process of externalization is 
basic. Learning or creating a symbolic code for the external 
world, that first and ongoing step of culture, binds itself 
inextricably to physical development. To call one the real 
person and the other costume, one cake and the other icing, is to 
fly in the face of the fact that they are everywhere, always 
bound together. There is no cultureless human, just as there is 
no bodiless human. The true noble savage, free from culture and 
alone in the world with its instincts, could exist no more 
readily than the discorporate mind, patterning symbols in a world 
of which it is, but is not, a part. The one is Beast, the second 
God, but only bound are they Human. 
Why they are bound relates directly to the unfinished nature 
of the human instinctual structure. Geertz, in an essay titled 
"The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man", 
puts the matter this way: 
The behavior patterns or ~ower animals are, at least to a 
much greater extent, given to them with their physical 
structure; genetic sources of information order their 
11 
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actions within much narrower ranges of variation, the 
narrower and more thoroughgoing the lower the animal. For 
man, what are innately given are the extremely general 
response capacities ... [which] leave it much less precisely 
regulated. (1973: 46) 
Or, as Berger puts it somewhat more succinctly, 
man's instinctual structure at birth is both 
underspecialized and undirected towards a species-specific 
environment ... [the human] world must be fashioned by man's 
own activity ... Man must make a world for himself. (1967:5) 
Human physiology, then, at least partially explains the human 
necessity of externalized symbolization. The human instinctual 
structure and the link between body and mind point the way 
towards a necessary creation of reality. 
What happens in our bodies also happened in our history: the 
story of human development is a story of body and symbol standing 
together. Culture, represented archaeologically by tools, began 
at least a million years before Homo sapiens developed. Culture, 
that means, didn't just happen after we stopped evolving. It 
happened while we were developing, and helped determine that 
development. Culture and nature grew up together, each affecting 
the other. 
Understood cybernetically, the ramifications of so simple a 
fact are enormous. Geertz again: 
As culture, step by infinitesimal step, accumulated and 
developed, a selective advantage was given to those 
individuals in the population most able to take advantage of 
it ... until what had been a small-brained, protohuman 
Australopithecus became the large-brained fully human Homo 
sapiens. Between the cultural pattern, the body, and the 
brain, a positive feedback system was created in which each 
shaped the progress of the other. (1973:48) 
As Bateson says, "it is the context which evolves" (1967:154), not 
one element (here culture) within a seemingly fixed context. 
Bateson's classic ecological example serves as an apt 
12 
( 
analogy: Eohippus didn't just react to the grassy plains to 
become a horse; the plains also developed turf as a response to 
the changing ungulates. The context, the full ecology, evolves, 
horse and turf together. So with the human being: the context--
the whole--changes as a result of dynamic feedback changes, not 
one variable (culture) reacting to a finished physiological 
context. 
Externalization, then, is biologically rooted in both the 
species and the individual, and the symbolic universe we create 
is as vital to humanity in general and humans in particular as 
the physical world we inhabit. 5 Or, to be more accurate, the 
symbolic and the physical make up one world, the real world, and 
it is that world which is vital. 
* * * 
Accepting the cultural createdness of reality doesn't 
necessarily lead to accepting the presence of multiple views of 
reality. You can accept culture, that is, without accepting 
cultures. Following this logic, you would accept the brain/body 
connection and the idea of a cybernetic, contextually inseparable 
development. But then you'd take your shot: just as the child, 
universally, emerges into this world unfinished, and just as Homo 
sapiens, uniformly, developed simultaneously in brain 'and body, 
we should expect a universal and uniform culture, an essentially 
50ur very perception of the physical world is itself symbolic; 
i.e., our brains do not directly experience anything; our sensory 
nerves send signals (symbols) to our brains which our brains 
interpret as real. 
13 
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singular way of looking at reality.6 Minor changes may occur, a 
different language here, a different costume there. But in the 
end, like unfinished babies who may vary from child to child but 
share their essential humanity, all cultures understand reality 
in the same terms. As we developed as a species, as our culture 
patterned our physiological development, as we selected 
ourselves, so to speak, one view of reality developed to match 
the single species. 7 
The simplest answer to this view is that the so-called 
'minor changes' are not minor at all; that language and costume 
(to use the two named above) are themselves part of a symbolic 
universe that defines the culture, not evanescent epiphenomena 
that change like leaves in autumn, yet leave the tree unmoved. 
The way to prove this is detailed comparative ethnography, cross-
cultural thick description aimed at debunking the myth of 
6Suppose my assumptions are wrong and this argument proves 
correct? Suppose contemporary philosophers like Bloom (1987) are 
right, that my base assumption of differing cultural views of 
reality shows false? What I am I left with then--just another 
hundred pages wasted on a bad paradigm? something else, I think. 
For if I explain some of the essentials of the American view of 
reality and it is ultimately proven that there is no 
distinctively American view of reality, that everyone views it 
the same way, then I will have explained some of the qualities of 
the universal understanding of reality, or perhaps of reality 
itself. 
It's here that Bloom and his ilk should be most careful. If 
philosophy (or anthropology itself) should ultimately deny the 
existence or significance of basic cultural differences, then the 
anthropologist's role increases, not decreases, in significance. 
A specific understanding of American notions of reality becomes a 
general understanding of human notions of reality, and 
ethnophilosophy becomes philosophy. 
7This view isn't just a derivative of the mainstream's thing-
epistemology. Timothy Leary, for instance, believes that culture 
can be reduced to our biological cornmonalities--that culture is 
a patterning developed from our DNA. 
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universalism, the maxim that we are, after all, just human 
beings. Chapter 3 will provide the cross-cultural evidence, 
drawn mainly from contemporary Hopi and Navaho cultures and older 
accounts of Dravidian and Chasidic cultures. 8 Chapter 4 will, 
similarly, provide the inside evidence, examples of American 
groups whose epistemologies counter our own. 
* * * 
Once we've passed through some of the terrain, begun our 
journeying towards America, where do we go? Chapter 2 will have 
brought us to the fortified castle of this realm, Chapter 3 will 
have put that castle in a comparative context, other castles in 
other valleys, and Chapter 4 will have shown the revolutionaries 
and malcontents: the quiet monks and palace radicals, cloistered 
women and political peasants. 
As every good tourist knows, once you've seen the sights get 
out of the carriage and meet the people. See how they actually 
live their local lives, whether the king picks potatoes among the 
peasants, whether the monks visit the castle. Chapter 5 brings 
us to that stage of the journey, what anthropology has come to 
call the 'practice' approach, locals living their lives. 
As every good tourist will also tell you, you can't trust a 
8My cross-cultural evidence is thin, not thick. Since none of my 
cross-cultural evidence is firsthand, I must depend mainly on 
ethnographies written from other than an ethnophilosophical 
perspective (with the exception of Witherspoon). I am forced to 
interpret interpretations, to translate translations, to comment 
on commentaries. My whole process remains meta, a step removed. 
My evidence of cQunterepistemologies in America, to the contrarJ, 
is based mainly on firsthand experience and knowledge. 
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tourist. What they say about dinner on the Seine with Beckett or 
the Tuilleries in Spring comes not only from their adventures, 
but also from their preconceptions. If I hate absurdism I 
probably didn't enjoy dinner, and if Miro on Chicago concrete is 
my cup of tea, the Tuilleries probably fell flat. Every tourist 
adventure, every foray into the field for enjoyment or analysis, 
is itself an interaction between the tourist and the land, the 
observer and the observed. 
I'll try, of course, to paint a fair picture of this land, 
American epistemology. But all along the way I will acknowledge 
that I do paint, that what you see is not the land itself, but my 
portrait of it. 
No painting can ever portray the fullness of what is. Great 
art merely shows some of it in a new way, starts the viewer off 





"Things are in the saddle and ride mankind." 
Emerson 
CHAPTER 2: THING CASTLE 
Most students of human communication acknowledge a 
connection between language and the thought process (Chomsky, 
Gumperz and Hymes, Sapir, Schneider, spradley, Turner, Tyler). 
Language, then, can serve as a clue to thought processes. Broad 
patterns of speaking--whether they be strategies for bounding, 
classificatory schemes (Witherspoon), myths (Levi-Strauss), 
idioms or joke forms (Basso)--reveal much of the ways in which a 
culture or a person structures thought. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have exposed one of the most 
important patterning forms of human speech: the metaphorical 
system. In Metaphors We Live By, they assert: 
most of our ordinary conceptual system is meta-
phorical in nature •.. metaphor is not just a matter 
of language ... human thought processes are 
largely metaphorical ... Metaphors as linguistic 
expressions are possible precisely because there 
are metaphors in a person's conceptual system (4-6). 
Arguing, for example, is understood in terms of war, and as a 
result we use phrases like attacking a position an indefensible 
strategy, a demolished point, to win an argument, to gain ground, 
he shot down my arguments, etc. We not only use many war terms 
to describe arguments, but we actually win or lose them, we see 
our co-arguer as an opponent, we actually gain ground, take a new 
line of attack. In short, "the things we do in arguing are 
partially structured by the concept of war"(p.4). The 
metaphorical concept structures both what we do (here arguing) 




Furthermore, the metaphorical systems within a culture are 
both internally and externally consistent. Each metaphorical 
system exhibits internal 'systematicity', i.e., it can't be that 
"I'm feeling up" means I'm happy and "My spirits rose" means I'm 
sad, because the upward direction must always be metaphorically 
associated with happiness (pp.7-18). Across systems, 'coherence' 
entails, so that II [t]he most fundamental values in a culture will 
be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most 
fundamental concepts in the culture" as well as with the other 
metaphorical systems (p.22). In other words, it's no coincidence 
that MORE, GOOD, HIGH STATUS, and THE FUTURE are all up. 
* * * 
In most of American English, reality is conceived of as a 
thing. The metaphorical system REALITY IS A THING presents 
itself most directly in idiomatic expressions such as 'out of 
touch with reality', 'a firm grasp on reality', and 'grounded in 
reality'. Reality is something you can touch or something that 
something else can be grounded in. Something you can touch. Even 
our generic term for referring to an as yet unnamed--'something'--
is structured in terms of thinghood. 
If reality isn't something, it's nothing; in either case, a 
thing. One of our most basic dichotomies is something/nothing, 
and even if a word isn't some thing, it must be conceived of as 
no thing. Either way, conceptualization occurs in terms of 
thinghood. 
Our linguistic semantics rest on the same fundamental 
18 
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thingness. The English language is noun-heavy, relying primarily 
on words that follow a fundamentally non-active pattern. Whorf 
has posited that the semantic structure of a language may pattern 
the thoughts of the cultural members. Hopi language, for 
instance, resides primarily in process, emphasizing verb-forms 
and strongly de-emphasizing nouns. Most 'nouns', for instance, 
are simply static forms of the verbs. Following Whorf's logic for 
Americans, we would expect to find an emphasis on the category of 
'thing', indeed the very organizing symbol we are pursuing. l 
Whorf's hypothesis, though, is rarely accepted in the 
extreme sense. Actors are understood to have far more control 
over their own lives, and epistemologies vary widely within and 
across grammatical systems. Whorf's hypothesis, then, is best 
looked at as a single piece of evidence, not a totalizing 
conclusion that summarizes a culture's epistemology. 
Mathematics here parallels grammar. In geometry, a clear 
distinction is made between a slope of zero and no slope, as in 
math in general zero and the null set are clearly differentiated. 
within the REALITY IS A THING metaphorical system, zero (or 
nothing) is clearly a thing, so a second concept of emptiness is 
created, an emptiness lacking even zero. 
Americans themselves associate reality with thingness. 
IOn a radically Whorfian level, it could be argued that my 
process/product dichotomy derives from the English verb/noun 




Interviews I conducted between May and October of 1987 clearly 
support the metaphorical system REALITY IS A THING. Ranking five 
jobs in terms of 'realness', respondents almost always considered 
construction work the most real and travel agent or receptionist 
the least real. The following represents a rough breakdown: 


















(n=20; llF ,9M)· 
The order of declining realness--construction work, cook, retail 
sales, receptionist, travel agent--came out as I expected; the 
hierarchy is directly related to REALITY IS A THING. Consonant 
with the metaphorical system, the jobs most connected with things 
are considered most real and those least connected with things 
are considered least real. The construction worker makes things; 
the cook changes some things into other things; the retail 
salesperson simply handles things in order to sell them; the 
receptionist and the travel agent are not involved with 'things', 
they merely facilitate people being able to get to things. 
My understandings are trustworthy only if coupled with 
similar understandings by natives. Other factors could have 
played a significant role in the ranking of the jobs, 
particularly matters of gender and sector (service vs. 
manufacturing). Construction work, for example, could be more 
highly ranked because traditionally male, and office receiving 
may be devalued because traditionally female. 
Informants themselves, however, rarely acknowledged issues 
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of gender or social class. Much more often, real work was 
considered physical work, particularly physical work including 
hands. One woman, for instance, in ranking sculpting more real 
than teaching English, explained: "I guess I think if you're 
doing something with your hands ... if you're making something, 
forming something," then your job is more real than if you're 
involved in something "obscure" like teaching English. A second 
woman insisted that a nurse's job is more real than a 
translator's, saying that "a nurse does tangible things, a 
translator is just like a conduit ... [things just go through 
them] ... they're not creating anything of their own." 
The first woman insisted that creativity was an important 
gauge of realness, consistently ranking doctor higher than 
accountant, social organizer, and others. But when asked to 
compare ditch digging and organizing programs at a nursing home, 
she quickly chose ditch digging as the most real, forcing herself 
to reexamine and ultimately reject her use of 'creativity' as a 
gauge of realness. She restructured her formula to include 
utility, asking questions like where the ditch digger was 
digging, and determined that usefulness to society was of prime 
significance. Usefulness, she said, could be either mental or 
physical, and therefore a translator was as real as a nurse. But 
when asked whether, as a whole, the body or the mind (i.e., 
mental or physical processes) was more real, she didn't hesitate: 
[T]he body has like got a grip, the body's 
more real than the mind ... because the mind 
like keeps changing ... [the body's] always 
the same basically. 
It wasn't surprising, then, that in her final responses, the 
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ranking of the five jobs in the table above, she did not justify 
her choice of construction worker by reference to creativity or 
utility. Instead, she said it is most real "because it's more 
tangible." 
Along with 'physical', 'tangible' proved quite a popular 
word in the interviews. I asked informants which of the four 
classic Aristotelian elements--air, earth, fire and water--they 
considered most and least real, and received roughly this 
distribution: 















Once again, the answers followed expectations of consonance with 
the metaphorical system REALITY IS A THING. Earth, the most 
tangible of the four classic elements, is most associated with 
reality; air, the least tangible, is considered the least real; 
water, which can be touched but not held, and fire, which can be 
felt but not held, both fall midway between the real and the 
unreal. 
The informants explanations mirrored my own. "Least 
tangible" was a phrase used often to explain the choice of air as 
least real. Similarly, earth was most often cited as most real 
along with an explanation of its thingness; one respondent said 
simply: "you're always standing on it, you can see it, and you 
live on it." What is most thingish is most real. 
Earth as thing and air as not thing, then, directly 
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correlate with earth as real and air as not real. Many of our 
uses of 'ethereal' and similar words reveal further evidence for 
the REALITY IS A THING metaphorical system. Mental health, for 
example, a gauge of connectedness to reality, is filled with 
phrases from the earth/air dichotomy. The disturbed and 
eccentric are 'airy', 'flighty', or just 'out of touch', whereas 
normal people are 'grounded' or 'down to earth'. 
Seen in this light, it is no coincidence that fairies and 
sprites are 'ethereal' and that witches fly through the air. The 
farther you go from reality, the farther you go from thing. And 
structured in terms of the air/earth conventional metaphor 
system, the farther you go from thing, the farther you go from 
earth. Those who are conceived of as far from reality--mystics, 
the insane, dreamers--are associated with air, the least thingish 
of the classic elements. Normal people--down to earth folks like 
you and me--live our lives on the ground, on this earth, that 
most thingish of things. 
The American kinship systems gives further credence to the 
REALITY IS A THING system. As Schneider (1968) points out, 
Americans understand kinship as an entirely biogenetic concept. 
Furthermore, that biogenetic relationship is permanent, 
regardless of emotional faIlings-out or personal disagreements: 
The relationship which is 'real' or 'true' or 'blood' 
or by 'birth' can never be severed, whatever its legal 
position ... It is culturally defined as being an objective 
fact of nature.... (1968:24) 
'Blood', which is conceived of as a 'thing' (p.24), is closely 
connected with the notion of a 'real' relationship: 
Consider the step-, -in-law, and foster relatives. The 
fundamental fact about these relatives is that they have the 
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role of close relatives without, as informants put it, being 
'real or blood relatives.' A step-mother is a mother who is 
not a 'real' mother, but the person who is now the father's 
wife. A father-in-law is a father who is not Ego's own 
father, but his spouse's father. And a foster son is not 
one's own or real son, but someone whom one is caring for as 
a son. 
Clearly 'thing', manifested here as blood, and 'real' share a close 
relationship in American cUlture. 2 
* * * 
Etymology gives further evidence of the solidity of the 
metaphor system REALITY IS A THING in American English. victor 
Turner comments on the value of etymological evidence in deriving 
current meaning: 
By analogy with geology, archaeology, and depth psychology, 
it may be possible to regard the etymology of key terms in 
major languages as a many-leveled system whose strata are 
composed of successively deposited layers of historical 
'experience'. Etymology is, after all, a mode of 'restoring 
the past', a form of linguistic 'self-reflexivity'. The 
many-leveled or 'laminated' geological crust of the earth is 
still 'alive' (think of the Mt. st. Helen's eruption); even 
more so is the human 'mind' or 'psyche', with its conscious, 
pre-conscious, and unconscious levels, each subdivided into 
layers or bands laid down by repeated dramatic or 
'traumatizing experiences'. Neurobiologists of the central 
nervous system recognize surviving 'archaic' structures in 
the brain, forebrain, and autonomic systems, which continue 
to interact with the neocortex. Similarly, a modern word's 
past 'senses' have influenced its present penumbra of 
meaning. (1982:16-17) 
The word 'reality' derives from the Latin root 'res', 
meaning 'thing'. The history of the word in English builds on 
2The American fascination with sociobiology may be explained to 
some extent by this blood-as-real folk category, and more broadly 
by the thing-as-real system. 
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the thinghood of reality. The Oxford English Dictionary 
(1961:309) lists as synonyms "In thing, in reality, really, 
actually (opposed to in name= nominally)".3 Thing equals reality. 
One of the crudest examples of this equation survives today in 
the term 'real estate'. Executors of wills, finding it necessary 
to distinguish between the material aspects of an estate and the 
non-material ones (such as title), chose to affix the word 'real' 
to the material ones. Real estate today applies to that most 
thingish (and as with Aristotelian elements--groundish) of 
things: land. 
But the O.E.D. definition reveals more than quaint 
survivals and further evidence of the rootedness of the 
metaphorical system; it also shows the inherent metaphysical bias 
of the system. The definition sets 'in thing' and 'in name' in 
opposition. It says earlier that a thing is "That which is 
signified, as distinguished from a word, symbol, or idea by which 
it is represented; the actual being or entity as opposed to a 
symbol of it"(309). By assuming a distinction between signifier 
and signified, the definition ties itself into an objectivist 
account of the universe. In the metaphorical system REALITY IS A 
3The use of the Oxford English Dictionary as an etymological 
source may bring questions about the distinctive Americanness of 
this system to the fore. The distinction between American 
epistemology and some broader culture group (Western, Modern, 
SAE, Indo-European) is a difficult distinction to make. 
Obviously many similarities exist from American to Britain or 
Germany or even France, and those similarities may include 
elements of a shared epistemology. Nevertheless, as I am 
confined by limitations of knowledge, resources, time and space, 
I have chosen to focus on the culture which for me is most 
accessible, the one I know best. For that reason my units of 
analysis derive mainly from America, although an occasional 
citation from the authoritative O.E.D. may mix things up a bit. 
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THING, then, America and Americans must view reality within an 
objectivist framework. 4 Reality must be singular and absolute. 
* * * 
What are the ramifications of viewing reality as a thing in 
an objectivist framework? For one, the REALITY IS A THING 
metaphor system explains the existence of ontological metaphors 
in English. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:25 et passim) do not 
explain the existence of ontological metaphors in American 
English; instead, they assume that "they are needed to satisfy 
certain purposes that we have." But on what grounds is 'need' 
determined? Need is certainly a cultural determination, and it 
is likely that two Americans would feel the need for ontological 
metaphors simply because they are so strong a part of everyday 
speech. The metaphors, and by extension the need, are based on 
the strength of the REALITY IS A THING metaphorical system in 
American English, and are not necessarily universally cross-
cultural. 
Lakoff and Johnson miss only one step in their theory of 
4Any attempt to describe the objective account of the universe in 
a footnote is doomed to triviality. The objective account of the 
universe represents the single most respected philosophical 
tradition in the west and underpins many western cultures. 
Briefly, though, the objective account holds that the world is 
made up of independent objects with independent properties, that 
we gain knowledge by experiencing the objects and learning about 
their properties and relationships. Our categories and concepts 
come from the objects's inherent properties, which are aspects of 
the world 'out there' as it exists. 
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ontological metaphors: the step provided by REALITY IS A THING. 
Reality, by definition, includes everything, so it certainly 
includes experiences such as events, actions, activities and 
states. Since reality is conceived in terms of thinghood in 
American English, experiences too must be conceived of as things. 
That step--the conception of experiences as things--represents 
ontological metaphoricalization. 
The following proof should layout clearly the process 
described above: 
1. Reality, by its American definition, includes everything. 
2. Experiences (events, actions, activities, states and other 
subjects of ontological metaphors) are real, since they 
are within 'everything'. 
3. REALITY IS A THING. 
4. Experiences are things. 
Lakoff and Johnson simply begin with number four, using 
'necessity' as their proof. 
The REALITY IS A THING metaphor system also explains the 
process whereby ontological metaphors become container metaphors, 
another area that Lakoff and Johnson do not fully explore. A 
container metaphor is a broad category of metaphors that 
structures understanding of unbounded objects in terms of 
containers. A culture, for example, is not an easily bounded 
concept, but is sometimes thought of in terms of a container, as 
in "She's inside the culture" or "He's not in the mainstream." 
The process by which culture becomes container is again linked to 
the real/thing system. Since reality encompasses all concepts, 
culture is real. And since reality is conceived of as a thing, 
culture becomes conceived of as a thing. A thing means a 
bounded, discrete entity, and bounding entails quantification. 
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Quantification, in turn, allows the determination of holding 
capacity, or 'containerization'. culture, therefore, as a thing, 
becomes conceived of as a container, which someone can be 
'inside' of. The following logical progression illustrates this 
process: 
1. Reality, by definition, includes everything. 
2. Culture is real. 
3. REALITY IS A THING. 
4. Culture is a thing. 
5. A thing is, by definition, a bounded discrete entity. 
6. Culture is a bounded, discrete entity. 
7. Bounding is, by definition, quantification (Lakoff and 
Johnson:29-30 and this paper, introduction). 
8. Quantification allows determination of ability to hold, or 
'containerization' (Lakoff and Johnson, QQ cit) . 
9. Culture is a container. (container metaphoricalization) 
REALITY IS A THING, then, not only frames reality within an 
objectivist framework, but also serves as the basis for the 
pervasive ontological and container metaphors in American 
English. 
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"The essential vocation of interpretive anthropology is not to 
answer our deepest questions, but to make available to us answers 
that others, guarding other sheep in other valleys, have given, 
and thus to include them in the consultable record of what man 
has said." 
Clifford Geertz 
CHAPTER 3: OTHER CASTLES IN OTHER VALLEYS 
In the last chapter I explored some of the evidence that 
points toward the American understanding of reality as thing. I 
need to ask, though, whether the tendency to reify, the reliance 
on a notion of objective truth, the earth/air dichotomy and other 
concomitants of the REALITY IS A THING system are necessarily 
American. In other words, why assume that American epistemology 
differs in any significant way from the rest of the world's? 
To answer that question I appeal to the ethnographic 
evidence: the Swan Pakhtun, to give one example, consider the 
occupation of 'surgeon' the lowest of all possible jobs (Lindholm 
1985). If the Swat Pakhtun based their rankings on an 
epistemology similar to America's (more tangible is more real), 
that would not be so. 
This 'appeal to the evidence', however, is facile at best. 
First, degree of reality and relative ranking are not necessarily 
correlates, as the American denigration of unskilled manual labor 
shows. Second, other cultural systems that may be unrelated to 
epistemology (aesthetics, ethics, etc.) could (and in fact do) 
play central roles in the Swat ranking of surgeon (Lindholm 
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1982:98).1 The increasing ascription of reality as a job 
becomes increasingly physical, then, could operate just like 
America's, but be temporarily 'outranked' by another system. 
That's to say that central epistemological metaphors may operate 
similarly across cultures, shaped in outward form by the local 
color of particular localities. 
Such an argument often holds true. Many societies exist, no 
doubt, which share epistemologies yet differ in outward form. 
More importantly, though, from my point of view, some cultures do 
operate with epistemologies radically different from our 
thingbound one. In some cultures, the 'minor changes', the 
discrepancies from our own system that in the above explanation 
represent merely 'local color', point the way toward differing 
conceptions of reality. They are themselves part of a symbolic 
universe that defines the culture. By revealing those other 
epistemologies, I will be putting America back in its local 
light, showing the REALITY IS A THING system as one example of a 
cultural epistemology, rather than the epitomizing example of the 
way to construe knowledge. 
Hopi, Navajo, Chasidic and Dravidian, each in its own way 
presents an interesting contrast with the dominant assumptions of 
American epistemology, although each of the 'ways' builds from a 
somewhat similar process-dependence. Although the first three of 
1Chapter 5 will in fact deal primarily with the conflicts between 
American epistemology and other cultural systems that are worked 
out in the day-to-day of the social sphere, particularly the 
discrepancy between a core element of the American thing-
epistemology and the democratic tradition. 
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these cultures have had significant contact with American culture 
during the last century, I will treat each as a distinct culture, 
not as counter- or sub- to the dominant American system. 
Where to draw the line around a culture is as difficult as 
where to draw the line around a storm. Does the eye of the storm 
count? Is a short break between two fronts part of the storm? 
What about the edges--the drizzling, the mist, the grey skies? 
Yinger (1982) charts the course here: in stating that a 
counterculture is a group whose norms and values "sharply 
contradict the dominant norms and values of the society of which 
that group is a part"(p.3). My definition of subculture will 
model itself on that of counterculture: a group whose norms and 
values differ enough with those of the dominant culture to be 
marked as 'other'. The key here is 'of which that group is a 
part'. I list Hopi and Navajo as outside American culture 
because although they have responded to American culture, their 
development has been molded mainly by forces internal to each. 
Their adaptations have grown around what Hodge calls the 
'resistant institutional core', so that changes, although 
present, occur predominantly within an organic setting. The 
epistemology, in particular, has remained essentially local, not 
caught in the net of America's growing hegemony.2 The cultures, 
20ne might argue that although changes have occurred around a 
resistant institutional core, they have occurred for so long and 
to such a great extent that their effects can no longer be 
considered minor. I don't mean to refute that. The effects on 
social structure, for instance, have been tremendous. I'm simply 
saying that the epistemological systems (my core concern) as they 
are revealed in language, ritual and metaphysics, have not been 




then, exist independently, not in a part-to-whole relationship 
with American culture. This is not to say that American culture 
has not played a significant and at times primary role in Hopi 
and Navajo cultural change. Simply, their epistemological 
interaction is intercultural, not intracultural. One can easily 
argue, for instance, that French culture had a tremendous impact 
on post-Elizabethan England (and vice-versa) without implying a 
part-to-whole relationship. 
Since I will concentrate on the rituals and epistemology of 
pre-twentieth century Chasidus, I list Chasidic culture as 
outside American culture despite the close association of the two 
during the last century. Dravidian culture, obviously, has never 
had any significant contact with our own. 
* * * 
Metaphor theory anticipates the incompleteness of the 
American REALITY IS A THING model. Theorists no longer 
understand metaphor as the substitution or comparison of one term 
for another. Rather, the principal and subsidiary subjects3 
interact to create a new whole. In the example MAN IS A WOLF, 
'man' and 'wolf' interact, wolf serving as a filter for man so 
that 
Any human traits that can without undue strain be talked 
about in "wolf-language" will be rendered prominent, and any 
that cannot will be pushed into the background. The wolf-
metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others--in 
short, organizes our view of man. (Black, 1981:75) 
3Black's terms, used to emphasize the similar function--subject--
rather than to claim functional discrepancies like a subject-
object division would. Other authors use vehicle/tenor, etc. 
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The focus here is on suppression and emphasis. If REALITY IS A 
THING suppresses, some elements of reality must be hidden. If 
some elements of reality are hidden, the system must be 
incomplete. 
But that's theory. I've developed an inherently unfair 
hypothetical syllogism: in Chapter 2 I showed a varied number of 
reasons why I think that Americans think reality is thing-like, 
then I tagged that tendency to associate reality and thing a 
'metaphorical system'; then, having reigned the phenomenon into 
my category, I made reference to the category's theory to say 
that the American notion of reality is incomplete. 
Clearly that's not fair. Metaphor theory may be wrong 
(I certainly haven't proved Black's theory) or metaphorical 
systems may not exist at all. One significant problem with 
Black's metaphor theory is its inherent assumption of an 
objective truth. In the above example, for instance, it assumes 
that there exists somewhere an objective, totalizing definition 
of human and human traits that the subsidiary subset (here 
'wolf') organizes. This is clearly contrary to Lakoff and 
Johnson's central argument of an experientialist approach to 
truth, of their rejection of a shopping-list approach to an 
object and its traits. At the very least, then, using both Black 
and Lakoff and Johnson creates a lack of internal consistency, a 
logical unsoundness in the theory. More importantly, though, 
using Black's theory in this context leads to an unpalatable (to 
me) conclusion--that reality does exist somewhere out there, and 
that each culture's epistemology is (by definition) an incomplete 
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metaphorical understanding of it. That may fit my carving 
analogy, but certainly not my creating one. For me, the sculptor 
is always artist, and as much as she cuts pieces off the block, 
she adds to the world something new. Finding truth is bounding 
and creating. 
Black's notion of incompleteness, then proves unusable in 
this analysis of American notions of reality. stripped of its 
objectivist assumptions and entailments, though, metaphor theory 
can be quite useful. Just as 'human' can be organized in terms 
of 'wolf', 'reality' can be understood in terms of another 
concept--'thing', 'process', 'wave', whatever. The interaction, 
not the incompleteness, holds the key here. And just as Black 
shows that 'man' can be understood in terms of 'wolf' or 
'vulture' or another concept, so reality can be understood in 
terms of process or thing or whatever. The importance is in the 
options. 
* * * 
One consequence of the REALITY IS A THING system is the 
subset TIME IS A THING, i.e., the reification of the notion of 
time. Whorf (1939: 240-241) points out that 
English terms, like 'sky, hill, swamp,' persuade us to 
regard some elusive aspect of nature's endless variety as a 
distinct THING, almost like a table or chair. Thus English 
and similar tongues lead us to think of the universe as a 
collection of rather distinct objects and events 
corresponding to words ...• We might isolate something in 
nature by saying 'It is a dripping spring.' Apache erects 
the statement on a verb .... The result corresponds to our 
'dripping spring', but synthetically it is 'as water, or 
springs, whiteness moves downward.' 
Similarly, English divides actions into objects because of 
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syntactical requirements. In response to a flashing, for 
instance, we say 'it flashed' or 'the light flashed', "setting up 
an actor IT, or A LIGHT, to perform what we call an action, 
FLASH. But the flashing and the light are the same; there is no 
thing which does something, and no doing. Hopi says only [the 
stative] rehpi"(263). The event, flashing, is described without 
reference to an object or an action. 
Our tendency to treat natural entities as if they were 
humanly created objects seeps into the world of time. In English, 
Whorf says, 
CYCLICITY brings the response of imaginary plurals. But a 
likeness of cyclicity to aggregates is not unmistakably 
given by experience prior to language, or it would be found 
in all languages, and it is not. (139) 
American English does understand time in relation to space, 
and time can be 'long' or 'short'. Ultimately, "A 'length of 
time' is envisioned as a row of similar units, like a row of 
bottles"(140) . 
Hopi, by contrast, does not objectify time at all. Where 
in English I would say "I stayed ten days," in Hopi I would 
say "I stay until day eleven" or "I leave on day ten." Days can 
progress, but cannot be counted like objects in a group to become 
an aggregate. For the Hopis, time simply does not have that 
quality. 
Similarly, although we normally say 'it's summer', the Hopis 
don't. To the Hopis, time cannot be objectified and set in 
relation to an object, 'it'. Time markers in Hopi form a formal 
part of speech by themselves, and cannot be used as subjects, 
objects or nouns. 
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One does not say 'it's a hot summer' or 'summer is hot'; 
summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. 
One does not say 'THIS summer,' but 'summer now' or 'summer 
recently.' There is no objectification, as a region, an 
extent, a quantity, of the subjective duration-feeling. 
Nothing is suggested about time except the perpetual 
"getting later" of it. And so there is no basis here for a 
formless item answering to our 'time.' (143) 
Since the Hopi do not objectify time 'like a row of bottles', 
actions do not disappear into some vast universe of lost time. 
[I]t is as if the return of the day were felt as the return 
of the same person, a little older but with all the 
impresses of yesterday, not as "another day," Le. like an 
entirely different person [as in American English]. (151) 
For this reason, the Hopi see continued repetition not as a 
comic or pathetic waste (as we do), but as a storing up, an 
accumulation, so that positive rituals performed 'when summer-
phase occurs' build with those of other summer-phases and 
accumulate an invisible charge that affects future events. 
Final evidence of a lack of a reification of time in Hopi 
culture lies in the verb tense system. The Hopi do not have 
tenses referring to past, present, or future. In fact, the only 
system of varied marking of verbs occurs in a division between 
what Whorf(113) calls 'reportive', 'expective' (which could be 
translated into English at any tense) and 'nomic' (the statement 
of general laws). Hopi divides validity; English divides time: 
[T]o the Hopi there is no temporal future; there is nothing 
in the subjective state corresponding to the sequences and 
successions conjoined with distances and changing physical 
configurations that we find in the objective state. (62) 
* * * 
Hopi epistemology understands the continuing duration-
feeling without recourse to a reified construct called 'time'; 
time is never conceived in terms of space. American notions of 
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reality as thinghood predispose the comprehension of time in 
terms of space, evidenced by the aggregation of cyclicity 
mentioned above by Whorf. 
By contrast, traditional Jewish notions of the relationship 
between time and space, particularly those notions prevalent in 
the Chasidic world, envisage a reverse of the American ordering: 
time is seen as dominant, more real, and space is merely "frozen 
time. " 
In The Sabbath, Abraham Heschel, a Jewish philosopher-
theologian, argues that Judaism molds itself predominantly in 
terms of time, a fact indicated by the culture's overwhelming 
emphasis on holy times and overwhelming de-emphasis of sacred 
space. Relating his understanding of the culture's relative 
ranking of space and time, he says: 
A special consciousness is required to recognize the 
ultimate significance of time. We all live it and are so 
close to being identical with it that we fail to notice it. 
The world of space surrounds our existence. It is but a 
part of living, the rest is time. Things are the shore, the 
voyage is in time •... To the spiritual eye space is frozen 
time, and all things are petrified events .... The boundless 
continuous but vacuous entity which realistically is called 
space is not the ultimate form of reality. (l95l:96-7)4 
The doctrines of Chasidism, a (so-called) mystical branch of 
JUdaism that flourished in the European Jewish world until the 
4Although it would be difficult to find a more passionate or 
poetic denunciation of the REALITY IS A THING metaphorical 
system, one insider's words cannot stand alone as representative 
of the metaphysics of a culture. The danger of the one person-
one culture approach has been well documented in critiques of 
Papa go Woman and We [IJ the Tikopia. 
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twentieth century, corroborate the philosophical ruminations of 
Heschel. In the Chasidic view, spirituality and temporality go 
hand in hand, contrasted against the tandem of spatiality and 
physicality. The Garden of Eden, for instance, is understood as 
initially a world of pure spirit and energy, a place (English 
misnomer) existing only within the realm of time. When the 
apple-essence is spiritually consumed, the world transforms 
itself into the physical realm, and Adam and Eve are aware of 
bodies (space) and nakedness (R. Tanya and other Lurianic 
scholars) . 
Chasidus not only ranks time/spirit above body/space, but 
actually comprehends the mission of the cultural/religious 
mandates as a concerted campaign for pure temporality. Existence 
entirely within time is the essence of immanence, of oneness with 
God. The mitzvot (obligations and good deeds) serve to liberate 
spiritual sparks inherent in every aspect of the physical world. 
The sparks were once whole, flaming oneness, but upon the 
transformation to a physical world they were broken into pieces 
(objectification) and hidden within klipot (shells or husks) from 
which they must be liberated. Their liberation and eventual 
complete reunification (the ultimate goal of the mitzvot), will 
result in "flip[ping] all of space into time"(Brand 1987). 
The attitude and process required for reunification and world 
temporalization are expressed in one term: dvaykut. 
The midnight vigils give a final ritual example of the 
dominance of time-notions over space-notions in the Jewish 
understanding of reality. At the midpoint of darkness during the 
night, senior male members of a household awaken in order to 
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study and cry,to cleave to the immanent world, to perform 
dvaykut. Darkness, a negative, physical power, is seen as most 
vulnerable at its midpoint, where a seam runs through it. If it 
is 'attacked' then, if one practices dvaykut, recognizes God as 
Yotzer (immanent, the world as a spiritual and temporal 
manifestation of God), then the spiritual/temporal realm can be 
affected. There is a chance to reunify, to flip space into time, 
to "transform darkness," an aspect of the physical world, "into 
unity," the ultimate form of the temporal world (Brand 1987). 
Understood somewhat more practically (or comprehensibly, at 
least), a devout (i.e. culturally valued) Jew understands that 
the ultimate form of reality is Yotzer, that the physical world, 
although perceived as a fractured, fractious physicality, is in 
essence a unity, the spiritual and temporal oneness of God. 
Performing the dictates of the culture, the mitzvot, is at once a 
process of helping along that unity on an objective level, and of 
helping oneself more directly experience the unity of pure 
immanence. 
So Heschel's understanding of ultimate reality as time-
bound, his understanding of space as merely a dependent sub-
category of time, finds company in traditional Chasidic 
understandings and rituals. And as he himself says, the thing-
lessness of reality also manifested itself in ancient biblical 
Hebrew: 
There is no equivalent for the word 'thing' in biblical 
Hebrew. The word 'davar' which in later Hebrew came to 
denote thing, means in biblical Hebrew: speech; word; 
message; report; tidings; advice; request; promise; decision 
sentence; theme, story; saying, utterance; business, 
occupation; acts; good deeds; events; way, manner; reason, 
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cause; but never 'thing'. 
* * * 
Dravidian, a language/culture group of southern India and 
northern Sri Lanka, shares with biblical Hebrew the absence of a 
term for thing. Tyler (1984:36) states that Dravidian lacks even 
"a metaphysical category corresponding to 'thing'." Dravidian 
also makes no distinction between rational thinking and feeling. 
The world, which is conceptualized experientially rather than 
objectively, can be equally approached through reason or feeling. 
Or, more accurately, one cannot divorce reason from feeling, so 
the world must be approached with reason and feeling, represented 
by one word in each of the Dravidian languages. 
The thinking/feeling combination grows directly from the 
lack of 'a metaphysical category corresponding to thing'. As 
Tyler points out, the concept of 'thing' enables representation: 
one thing represents another thing. without a world understood 
a priori as thing, knowledge and feeling must be one: an 
interaction among parts of a whole, or an interaction among 
elements of a process. Most of Indian philosophy, Tyler shows, 
develops from this metaphysical premise: 
... [Indian philosophy] derives both the material world and 
the means of knowing it from intentionality and desire. 
These "feelings" are not irrational sources of subjective 
error that rationalism must contest and defeat in the quest 
for objective truth, but are instead the very source and 
enabling condition for any rationality whatever. What for 
SAE is only a disturbing philosophical afterthought in the 
form of phenomenology is, in Indian tradition, the starting 
point and foundation of philosophy. (1984:36) 
* * * 
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If the Dravidian notion of reality seems to preclude 
semiotics (the representation of one thing by another, 
arbitrarily labeled 'signifier') by denying the metaphysical 
category of 'thing', then the Navajo view of reality reverses the 
causality usually inherent in semiotics. For the Navajo, symbol 
precedes thing: 
The symbol was not created as a means of representing 
reality; on the contrary, reality was created or transformed 
as a manifestation of symbolic form. In the Navajo view of 
the world. language is not a mirror of reality; reality is a 
mirror of language. (Witherspoon 1977:35) 
This view, although radically different from the Hopi, Jewish 
and Dravidian views, also contradicts the American REALITY IS A 
THING. To the Navajo, reality is not a thing, reality is a 
process of interrelation among symbols, with language the symbol 
par excellence. Human reality, and with it thinghood, are one 
possible manifestation of that process. As Witherspoon states, 
the world itself is a "stage of symbolic action" (36) , for the 
movements of the things which we see are only the manifestations 
of the thoughts and intents of inner forms. The thoughts and 
intents are primary; the externalized physicality secondary. 
This world of the primacy of motion can best be glimpsed 
with an analysis of the Navajo linguistic system. Unlike 
English, which focuses almost exclusively on nouns, noun 
modifiers and noun connectives, 
... the Navajo language is dominated by verbs. There seem to 
be few, if any, nouns that are not either passive forms of 
verbs or derived from verbal forms. particles, prefixes, 
and postpositions are used primarily as verbal modifiers. 
The dominance of verbs in Navajo also corresponds to the 
Navajo emphasis on a world in motion. (48) 
The Navajo kinship system parallels this order. Mis-
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understood by generations of anthropologists because of their 
insistence on defining kinship in terms of shared biogenetic 
substance (see Schneider 1985), Navajo kinship resides in process: 
The emphasis, focus, and literal 
Navajo concepts of ke solidarity 
action, not in static substance. 
emphasis) 
frames of reference of 
are found in affective 
(Witherspoon 1977:88, my 
Just as a Navajo noun is almost always a verb in passive 
form, so a second kinship system, kei, is based on the active 
system described above ('-i' is simply a marker to indicate 
specific case). This system is indeed based on thingness (number 
of relation-bonds apart), but, significantly, it is used only with 
complete strangers, and is the subordinate, marked case of the 
process-oriented kinship system. 
As thing is a marked case of process, so rest is a marked 
case of motion: 
[T]he principal verb in the Navajo language is the verb "to 
go" and not the verb "to be," which is of relatively minor 
importance in Navajo. This seems to indicate a cosmos 
composed of processes and events, as opposed to a cosmos 
composed of facts and things. (49) 
Even in classifying objects at rest, the primary determinant is 
motion: objects are categorized (for syntactical purposes) in 
terms of ability to move or be moved. 
The Navajo conception of reality in terms of motion and 
process rather than 'thing' manifests itself in the air/earth 
dichotomy described earlier for the American English system. As 
the analysis in Chapter 2 predicts, 'air' is the element most 
real for the Navajo: 
What is tne source or power of movement? The answer to this 
question is air, for air is the only substance or entity in 




to bear knowledge. Air is the ultimate source of all 
knowledge and animation. (532) 
The inner forms of people, the forms for whom this world is but 
a 'stage for symbolic action', are the small wind souls (who 
cause the fetus to grow and control involuntary processes) and 
the instanding wind souls (who control thoughts, speech, and 
actions). Similarly, it is the wind which gives the mountains 
power, moves sound and light and moves the clouds which create 
water. Finally, air lets everything live; it is the one element 
which living (and hence more real) creatures need most 
desperately. 
Mythically, as well, air holds the central place for the 
Navajos: First Man and First Woman are known as 'mist people' or 
'air people'; wind is the main information-giver, the secret-
sharer, the guide, the protecting spirit; breath is repeatedly 
associated with strength. 
In language, kinship, metaphysics and myth, then, the 
combination of process, motion and symbol hold a privileged 
position over 'thing'. For the Navajo, reality is definitely NOT 
a thing. 
* * * 
Clearly, then, others, guarding other sheep in other 
valleys, have given other answers. All the world does not 
understand reality in terms of thinghood. continuing duration, 
motion, and an experientialist approach to the universe all 
receive primary positions in other lands and other cultures. And 
as differently as those cultures construe reality, each places 
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stock in the concepts of process and interaction. 5 
Which leads us, by way of India and Arizona, the Polish 
shtetl and the desert mesa, back to America. Does anyone, or any 
group, construe reality in terms different from the dominant 
THING model? Where in American culture, if anywhere, does 
process play a paramount role? Who understands reality as motion 
or action? When is experiential ism valued? To begin to answer 
those questions, I'll turn my attention back home, but this time 
to those who stand at least a little out of the mainstream: the 
countercultures and subcultures, the deviants, dissenters and 
dreamers. 
5,Why' these other cultures understand reality in a way (or ways) 
so drastically different from America's is a question that could 
take at least another hundred pages to answer. yinger (personal 
communication) suggests the possibility that cultures which 
emphasize an anthropocentric universe "may be those given to 
'thingness'," whereas those who see humanity as part of a complex 
interdependence are more prone towards a Galilean way of seeing. 
Marx, as Yinger pointed out, believed that class played a more 
important role than culture in determining epistemologies. 
I agree with both Yinger and Marx. Undoubtedly, an 
anthropocentric approach tends towards hierarchal ism and 
fractiousness, towards a splintering of environmental holism. 
Marx's denigration of the bourgeoisie's skewed epistemology 
reveals Marx's own process-orientation, but also nicely points 
out the prevailing thingishness of the English and German 
bourgeoisies's epistemologies of the time. Each answer, though, 
yinger's and Marx's, brings with it another 'why'. Why does 
anthropomorphism lead to a thing-epistemology? Why does the 
bourgeoisie emphasize the same? I don't pretend to be able to 
answer either now, but I will note that it seems that the closer 
a culture gets to the twentieth century West, the more likely it 
is to attach itself to the thing-epistemology. English seems to 
have made the switch around the fourteenth century, when 'thing' 
stopped meaning assembly, saying, legal process, etc., and 
started meaning a signified objects. Modern Hebrew, as I noted 
earlier, incorporated in its rebirth a meaning of 'davar' as 
thing that its precursor had never contained. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE REVOLUTIONARIES 
Where to draw the line? popping up here, there, and 
everywhere, that question holds the key to this chapter, and in 
many ways to the study as a whole. Where to draw the line, for 
instance, around American culture? The Navajo proved a storm 
cloud before, and the weather is turning wet again. Drawing a 
line--like a border around reality. As I cut and carve the flow 
of the world that is, as I pluck bits from the stream, arbitrary 
as a child's net, do I wear the hat of bounder or creator? Am I 
the cultural cop, putting away the deviants? Or am I the waste 
disposal engineer, quietly cleaning up the bits and pieces that 
don't quite fit into my definition of 'clean'? Or, finally, am I 
the SCUlptor, the creator, defining America as only my mind's eye 
can, in the only way I can? 
In a curious way, I stand in relation to American culture as 
America stands in relation to reality. America defines its 
reality; I define my America. As the introduction stated, every 
definition, every cut-carve, encompasses both bounding and 
creating. Aware of it or not, no artist is not also an enforcer, 
no enforcer not also an artist. 
But can I admit all this and remain a scientist, even an 
interpretive one? I counter with the all-too-obvious: how can I 
not admit this and remain a scientist? That I present, in these 
mere seventy pages, anything more than a brief sampling of what 
America is, anything more than a brief sampling of American 
epistemology, anything more than a brief sampling, even, of 
American epistemology as I see it and as it bears on issues of 
reification and process, is ludicrous. I have cut and carved, I 
46 
know it, and I drag it out for you to see. 
Is this portrait selective, then? Am I missing, or 
omitting, important parts of America? To answer, I pose another 
question: Is America missing, or omitting, important parts of 
reality? If Gehlen, Plessner, Geertz, Berger, Bateson and the 
rest of the gang (see introduction) are right , no. There is no 
fountain of truth, no Reality sitting somewhere beyond our 
conceptual reach, laughing at our ineptitude, no all-encompassing 
union of Local Truths that gleams brighter than the sum of local 
flames. 
To assume that I omit or miss, we must assume an American 
culture somewhere "out there", an objective, existing, almost 
tangible thing (that word!) waiting to be discovered. A 
Newtonian Sleeping Beauty dreaming of that ultimate, unbiased, 
perfect frame-of-reference observer to chart her beauties. 
But we live in Einstein's time. There are no more 
privileged observers, no stationary points of reference. America 
moves relative to me and you, I move relative to you and America, 
you move relative to America and me, and my explanation of 
America's spacetime is America as I see it. And there is no more 
honest portrait than the one I see. We are all living on 
accelerated frames, to continue the analogy, and there is no 
braking, no way to stop for a moment, rest on the wings of the 
ether and see the world the way it really is. 
Every analysis is itself an interaction, a mingling of me 
and America, a creation of me-America. I cannot find it without 
helping to define it, without being a partner in its creation. 
The interaction, reified, I call culture. I am like the particle 
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physicist, defining particles that she knows do not exist outside 
of her experiments, the particles that collapse from their 
pseudo-existence of wave-particle to join her in a transient 
creation, the particles that she uses to build and explain the 
self-conscious world of physicist-reality. until I lift the lid 
on Schrodinger's box, the cat is alive, dead, and dreaming all at 
once. Only when I measure, when I record, when I analyze, is the 
cat's fate sealed. The cat and I, together, create reality. 
There is no reality without me, or at least no reality as we 
understand it. 
* * * 
To open the lid, then. To draw the line. Where does 
American culture begin and end? Should I include pictures of 
reality that oppose my dominant thing-model, yet flourish within 
America's borders? 
Yes. To exclude obvious epistemological challenges to my 
dominant model would be to draw a line too harsh for my aesthetic 
tastes, to paint a picture not stirring enough, one unlikely to 
provoke the visceral tug of pleasure that great art does. 
Deviants then. Challenges. If I'm right in Chapter 2, if 
the thing-model structures Americans's thoughts about reality, 
then how can other models challenge? How can a structured mind 
admit dissent? 
The answer is that culture (American, to keep in context) 
does not so rigidly prevent alternatives as my first two chapters 
suggest. For my analysis to posit a monolithic, monarchical 
culture I would need to hearken back to a discredited 
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functionalism, at least. And to deny dissent (in addition to 
being too harsh a line to draw around the culture for my tastes) 
would be to deny change. On an epistemological island where the 
natives all think alike, who brings changes?1 
It is far simpler and more coherent to say that American 
culture is not monolithic, that it permits (tolerates? stomachs?) 
dissent. Some anthropologists, among them Mumford and Schneider 
(1968:107 et passim), have insisted that ambiguity and opposition 
are themselves the key determinants of a culture. A culture 
can't operate without opposition (Yinger [1982], AFC Wallace 
[1962], Slater [1971]) and that very opposition provides an 
anthropologist with the clues he needs to begin to understand the 
culture (Yinger, Turner, Schneider). 
But how do I explain these contradictions, other than to 
invoke the names of some ancestral figures and rest with a 
contented nodding of my head? The easiest way, no doubt, is to 
say, quite solemnly, that the exception proves the rule. But 
Geertz (1975), among others, might object to this common-sense-
as-science approach. Alternatively, I could pullout the all-
purpose build-a-wall-between-us-and-them functionalist argument 
of "reaffirming collective identity." But more than Geertz et al 
would holler this time, pointing out rightly that members change 
groups and ideas flow across the wall. 2 
lImperialist boats, of course, the political economy wing of our 
field would answer (see Ortner 1984). But when the natives are 
American imperialists, the boat has sprung a leak. Who's 
"hegemon-izing" us? 
2r don't mean to say that this doesn't operate symbolically at 
all, just that it's by no means a sufficient explanation. 
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So, giving up on common sense and the good old conflict model, I 
need to probe deeper--for analogies from other fields (Bateson's 
idea 1972), then even deeper, towards the bedrock of 
explanations. 
J. Milton Yinger, in his analysis of deviance and opposition, 
Countercultures, argues that countercultures are in some ways 
analogous to biological mutations (1982:285 et passim). A 
species's state remains unchanged over long periods of time, but 
the existence of recessive genes in the gene pool makes possible 
adaptation to environmental change. Or, more ecologically 
speaking3 , both the species and the environment outside 
of the species contain matched propensities for change: the 
entire context is internally bound together. 
Culture and counterculture live together in a manner similar 
to species and mutation. The mutation, or counterculture, 
provides a reservoir of alternatives to draw from in times of 
major ecological crisis (or 'change', to be less value-laden). 
And once again, the cybernetic approach--Yinger cites Gerlach and 
Hine (1973:260): 
[I]f you're not part of a mutation, you are part of the 
environment which selects for or against it. No one can 
escape an evolutionary role. (cited in Yinger 1982:288) 
Which is simply to put a new twist on an old saying: If you're 
not a part of the solution, you're a part of the problem. 
Philip Slater provides a similar explanation of what he 
calls the "alternatives" to the dominant culture: 
3Bateson's term; yinger prefers "field" or "cybernetically". 
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These latent alternatives usually persist in some 
encapsulated and imprisoned form ("break glass in case of 
fire"), such as myths, festivals, or specialized roles. 
Fanatics continually try to expunge these circumscribed 
contradictions, but when they succeed it is often fatal 
to the society. For, as Lewis Mumford once pointed out, 
it is the "laxity, corruption, and disorder" in a system 
that makes it viable, considering the contradictory needs 
that all social systems must satisfy. Such latent 
alternatives are priceless treasures and must be carefully 
guarded against loss. For a new cultural pattern does not 
emerge out of nothing--the seed must already be there. 
(Slater 1971:110-11, cited in Yinger 1982:286) 
Where Yinger focuses primarily on ideas and social groups that 
are at least somewhat conscious of their opposition to the 
dominant culture, Slater emphasizes the ritual aspects of the 
culture (myths, festivals, social roles) that contradict the 
pattern of which they are a part. 4 
As we're about to see, this distinction between 
institutional and ritual (Yinger and Slater) echoes victor 
Turner's distinction between the temporary communitas of ritual 
liminality and the more lasting (although less complete) 
communitas of institutionalized liminality. Turner (1969) paints 
a picture of the ritual process where the movement towards 
communitas (the state of Buber's [1970] "Ich-du"), entails a 
passing of the ritual participants over the cracks in the 
cultural sidewalk, the interstices of the social structure, the 
period of liminality. Turner delves into a number of cross-
4Yinger does include Slater in his chapter on social change, and 
expands on ritual contradictions in his chapter on symbolic 
countercultures. Although the latter chapter sets out a detailed 
explanation of the "how's" of internal ritual counter-
epistemologies, the "why's" are subsumed under the general 
"why's" of Yinger's understanding of social change as a sort of 
non=lI·'larxist cultural dialectics. 
51 
( 
cultural liminal states and emerges with this (Levi-Straussian) 
series of "binary oppositions or discriminations" (1969:106) , 
liminality represented on the left (coincidence?), status system 






Anonymity/systems of nomenclature 
Absence of property/property 
Absence of status/status 
Nakedness or uniform clothing/distinctions of clothing 
Sexual continence [or community]/[standard]sexuality 
Minimization of sex distinctions/maximizations of sex distinctions 
Absence of rank/distinctions of rank 
Humility/just pride of position 
Disregard for personal appearance/care for personal appearance 
No distinctions of wealth/distinctions of wealth 
Unselfishness/selfishness 
Total obedience/obedience only to superior rank 
Sacredness/secularity 
Sacred instruction/technical knowledge 
Silence/speech 
Suspension of kinship rights and obligations/kinship rights 
and obligations 
continuous reference to mystical powers/intermittent 
reference to mystical powers 
Foolishness/sagacity 
Simplicity/complexity [in speech and manners] 
Acceptance of pain and suffering/avoidance of pain and 
suffering 
Heteronomy/degrees of autonomy (Turner 1969:106-07) 
To Turner's list I add those other polarities that he mentions 
later in the text: 
now/past-present-future 
speculative/pragmatic 
generative of imagery, philosophical/this-worldly 
characterized by structurally inferior categories and 
groups/preoccupied with status 
existential/cognitive 
artistic and religious/legal and political5 
5The reader will no doubt have noticed the similarity between 
some of Turner's ritual properties and my own distinction between 
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Significantly, many of these attributes are significantly 
epistemological rather than social structural per se. 
As society increasingly diversifies, Turner sees the 
tendency for the ritual stage of liminality and its sidekick 
communitas to become institutionalized into the form of 
subjugated autochtones, individual societal roles (e.g., court 
jester), outsiders/strangers, millenarian movements, or 
structurally small nations (1969:108). Liminality, that is, in 
its modern setting becomes marginality or structural inferiority. 
But less is sometimes more. Structural inferiority or 
marginality almost always finds itself coupled with a moral and 
ritual superiority. Secular weakness conceals sacred power, and 
vice-versa. 6 
In all cases of secular weakness/sacred power, the group 
continues to promote countercultural values. Structure-savers, 
faced with the closet anarchy of sustained communitas, recognize 
its power. They may construct a series of taboos with which to 
handle the de-constructers (M. Douglas 1966, cited in Turner). 
The liminals may become polluting to the status-conscious; the 
structure-bound may see the structure-less as engulfed in a 
cyclone of magic and witchcraft. They are dangerous, the bound 
thing-epistemology and process-epistemology. More to come. 
6Edward Said's name springs to mind here, but at this point I 
won't suggest anything more than the possibility that his much-
discussed "oriental ism" thesis ties into some very powerful 
theoretical issues, that other-ness may be one manifestation of 
the superior's ascription of liminality in an increasingly global 
social structure. Political economists may find a boat after 
all. Polemic may be the harbinger of a more grounded theory. 
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sometimes say, to us, to our children, and to society. 
Of course the wall is not impassable, as the (pre-
industrial) ritual process itself shows. Liminality is one stage 
of the process, the passing through from tired structure to 
renewed. The home of communitas, liminality serves as the 
structure-bound's retreat, a time to heal the wounds of status 
fights and soothe the aching limbs of structure in the calm 
waters of the uninhibited I-you. Turner, that is, assdigns a 
separate epistemology to each side of his structurally split 
world: liminality brings with it communitas and the I-you; 
structure brings with it what I call the 'thing-epistemology', a 
ciose neighbor of Buber's I-it. 
In Turner's view, modern society preserves the balance of 
traditional ritual. As the whole of traditional society has 
fractured, groups of marginals have picked up the piece of 
traditionalism, and like hermit crabs, made the liminal 
stage their home. 
[W]ith the increasing specialization of society and culture, 
with progressive complexity in the social division of labor, 
what was in tribal society a set of transitional qualities 
"betwixt and between" defined states of culture and society 
has become itself an institutionalized state. (Turner 
1969:107) 
And as once the fixed path led from structure to limen and back, 
now a free-floating pendulum swings from the extreme of oVer-
structure and its epistemology to the extreme of communal anarchy 
and its epistemology, centered always on the historic middle 
ground of tribal balance: 
Exaggeration of structure may well lead to pathological 
manifestations of communitas outside or against "the law." 
Exaggeration of communitas, in certain religious or 
political movements of the leading type, may be speedily 
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fOllowed by despotism, overbeaurocratization, or other modes 
of structural rigidification. (1969:129) 
society, Turner says, balances precariously between structure and 
communitas, between fascism and anarchy, a cultural judge 
mediating between the powerful husband and the powerless wife. 
Turner leaves a portrait of a fluctuating but ultimately 
stable system. Although he emphasizes the dialectic of structure 
(with its accompanying epistemology) and liminality (with its 
epistemology), the dependence of each on the other, Turner sees 
structure as predominant, communitas as structure's refresher: 
In the religion of preindustrial societies, [communitas] is 
regarded rather as a means to the end of becoming more fully 
involved in the rich manifold of structural role-playing. 
In this there is perhaps a greater wisdom .... There is a 
mystery of mutual distance, what the poet Rilke called "the 
circumspection of human gesture," which is just as humanly 
important as the mystery of intimacy. (1969:139) 
Turner's dominant-SUbmissive ordering of structure and communitas 
leads him to brush off (dismiss? derogate?) Buber's admiration 
for communitas-based kibbutzim and kvutzot as well as the works 
of Rousseau, Marx, Louis Henry Morgan (1877) and Edmund Leach, 
calling them Edenic fantasies. structure remains predominant, as 
it must for society to function in Turner's world. 7 
I do not question the necessary predominance of structure in 
7If Turner had come from another culture, a different weighting 
might have resulted. The communitas-as-refresher notion, for 
instance, may have come from the Christian sunday-day of rest 
symbol. Traditional Jewish culture reverses that ranking, saying 
structure--the six week days--exists for the sake of communitas--
the Sabbath (see Heschel 1951). Secondly, Turner was brought up 
"in the orthodox social-structuralist tradition of British 
anthropology" (Turner 1969:131), which may have influenced him 
towards emphasizing the dominance and wisdom of structure. 
Finally, the traditional English emphasis on interpersonal 
distance (contrary to America) may have played a role in his 
invocation of "the mystery of mutual distance." 
the social world. As Margaret Mead once said, 'Who takes out the 
garbage in utopia?' All collectives eventually develop some 
structure, as the kibbutzim show. And even a culture fixed in the 
flames of a process-epistemology exists in a social structural 
world, as the Hopi clans and kivas show. I do take issue, 
though, with Turner's quick attatchment between epistemology and 
social structural position. Although his model of steady-state 
seems fair and well-documented for questions of social structure, 
assigning epistemologies to the same model represents an overbold 
step. He assumes that thing-epistemology always accompanies 
structure and that process-epistemology always accompanies 
liminality/marginality. communitas is only for interludes and 
inferiors. 
His steady state seems an unchangeable field, a marriage 
with dominant husband and submissive wife in constant argument. 
The wife may sometimes get the upper hand, but over time the 
basic power relationship stays constant, and divorce is 
impossible. 
But we live in an age of liberation. I don't mean to imply 
that communitas (the wife) needs to overtake or separate itself 
from the structure epistemOlogy, just that it is possible. In 
contrast, Turner's steady state seems a demarcated field over 
which a game may range, but within whose borders it must be 
played. 
How then, on this demarcated field, should we deal with the 
ethnographic evidence of the last chapter? Is Hopi culture, 
intimate as it is with a process-epistemology, merely an extreme 
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swing of a dependable pendulum? Are Chasidism and the holistic 
I-thou that Buber derived from it a momentary lapse of structure? 
Are Navajo and Yap (among others), with their emphasis on 
affective action and not static substance, simply peregrinations 
of the steady state, brief jaunts away from its time-tested and 
constant home? 
I could answer yes to all of the above. But why? Why 
assume that culture after culture, historical period after 
historical period, manifests only a temporary deviation from the 
epistemological norm, an expected occasional over-correction from 
a too-ordered precursor? 
The theoretical structure has become too harsh, too rigid. 
To reinject Yinger (1982) into the equation seems an appropriate 
mellowing step. Process-epistemology (the emphasis on action 
over substance, relating over relata, etc.), a way of seeing 
similar to Turner's 'communitas', seems to me better represented 
in American culture as a recessive gene than one element of a 
pendulum swing. It is the countercultural challenger, certainly, 
jabbing at the dominant epistemology and waiting for its underdog 
chance. But we don't need to think of it as permanently 
challenging. A mutation can change the organism (for better or 
for worse) and the ecological balance can permanently shift. 
When Eohippus became the horse, turf became grass, and although a 
return to the Eohippus-turf world is biologically possible, it 
isn't automatic. The challenger can win. 
That point bears remembering, for comparative, theoretical, 
and political reasons. The form of a cultural epistemology 
(American, to stay in context again) is not permanent, not even 
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if that permanency is conceived of in terms of a flux. 8 The 
possibility of 'culturogenetic' change, carried in Slater's 
"encapsulated" rituals and Yinger's countercultures, exists. 
Either one of the two seemingly prevalent epistemological genes--
Turner's 'structure'-associated epistemology and 'communitas'-
associated epistemology (or a gene left unstudied here) can 
become a determining factor in ecological change. 
* * * 
8Although the social structure, of course, may indeed be in such 
a steady-state flux. 
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Turner's "structure" roughly parallels my notion of the 
dominant American thing-epistemology. The preoccupation with 
state, differentiation, nomenclature and money that characterizes 
structure brings to mind thingness. Nomenclature, for instance, 
rests firmly on bounding, on cutting and carving, on somewhat 
arbitrarily differentiating created 'elements' from the flow; in 
other words, it rests firmly on the action that characterizes, 
sui generis, the thing-epistemology. Similarly, thing-
epistemology expects structure's predilection for money and 
status: 'real' as a noun meant, among other things" a coin and a 
king from the fourteenth century to the nineteenth (OED:200). 
The "partiality/totality" dichotomy brings to mind the 
distinction between the Hopi's cyclic (whole) time notions and 
our own linear aggregate (splintered) notions. That distinction 
returns in Turner's observation of the tendency for liminality to 
be existentially rooted in the now and structure to discriminate 
among past, present, and future (1969:113). As Chapter 3 noted, 
the Hopi make no use of the concept of a past or future. Maybe 
most strikingly, Turner emphasizes "the close connection that 
exists between structure and property"(1969:129). And what word 
survives as the most obvious marker of the reality-as-thing 
cultural construction? "Real estate", the very word for 
property, solid land--the opposite of flow and fairies. 
Turner's "structure", then, correlates closely with my 
"thing-epistemology." And although I do not accept his dialectic 
steady-state, I certainly embrace his "liminal/communitas" 
category as one challenger to the dominant epistemology. In 
sifting through the deviants, dissenters, and dreamers, then, it 
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will be more than useful to keep Turner's categories in mind as a 
sort of geiger counter of cultural opposition and alternatives. 
And sifting through the dissenters is what I'm just about to 
do. Having decided to draw my cultural line generously around 
them, and having found a way to incorporate them into the 
cultural painting without undue clashing (and hopefully with 
added subtelty), I now begin the actual execution. 
Deciding which dissenters to include isn't easy. In a 
culture as humanly large as ours, dissent pops out from every 
foxhole. I am, for instance, a dissenter, a cultural actor 
conscious of epistemologies and holding the desire to change 
(subvert?) the dominant model. But I do not dissent, as an 
individual, ex nihilo; I draw my ideas from cultural models 
(radical academic and theatrical, in my case), communal paradigms 
from which I construct my own montage. An analysis of 
individuals, no matter how broad, would tend towards a 
philosophical or psychological study. What I want to observe, 
from an anthropological angle, are the group formulations, the 
communal symbolic models from which individuals build their 
philosophies and psychologies. 
It's said that you can find everything in America (another 
argument for the wide-line model of drawing the local 
epistemology), so even narrowing dissent down to group 
epistemological dissent leaves a broad field. I have chosen the 
following four counter-epistemologies, then, for their varying 
relationships to the dominant society and epistemology. 
Theater represents the closest example of Slater's 
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"encapsulated" ritual, an institution/recurring festival rarely 
considered even to cohere, let alone to contain or promote an 
independent epistemology. The world of physics, by contrast, 
represents a part of society that exists primarily to determine 
meaning, an institution into which we have poured the authority 
for discovering the way the world really is. At the other end of 
the authority structure stands feminism, a self-conscious attempt 
by structural marginals/inferiors to reformulate or expand the 
dominant epistemology. Finally, the 'drug culture', represented 
here primarily by Timothy Leary, shows a group of non-liminals, 
individuals once favored (value?) by the social structure, who 
chose to disenfranchise themselves and radically attack the 
dominant society. 
THEATER 
My descriptions of theater's counter-epistemology, its role 
as a recessive gene/liminal state/countercultural challenger, 
will derive mainly from my own experiences. Recounted here, 
these experiences will constitute the most directly ethnographic 
record in the thesis. I have acted, in everything from 
professional Shakespearean repertories to church-basement 
community summer companies, with everyone from accomplished 
Broadway actors to high school students, for six years. So 
although I may occasionally summon up the names of tribal elders-
-Stanislavski, Beck, Schechner--I will for the most part relie on 
my own memories, on the picture that has developed in my brain of 
the unphotographable experiences of the years since 1981. Many 
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of my ideas grow (more like a vine than a tree) from a paper 
entitled "The Religious Elements of Theater: From 
Autoanthropology to Nomothetics" that I wrote for Milt Yinger's 
seminar in the sociology of religion. 9 
Before delineating theater's epistemology, I need to show 
the group nature of the enterprise. An American, even an 
American academic, expects to see epistemologies (although she 
might not use that word) promulgated by institutions like 
religion or deviant groups like the hippies. She expects a 
coherent epistemOlogy from theater the way she expects it from 
the auto workers union: not at all. contrary to politicians, 
priests and physicists, actors and auto workers are not supposed 
to be enmeshed in a specific way of seeing the world. 
One primary reason they're not is that they're not thought 
of in terms of a group. communists, Calvinists, and 
Creationists, yes; actors no. But as I have outlined elsewhere 
(1986b), theater clearly holds together as a group. Subgroups 
like Beck and Malina's Living Theater serve as extreme examples 
of theatrical unity: members paired sexually (rejecting 
marriage), raised children, and conducted economic and political 
affairs in an entirely communal manner. A code of ethics on the 
wall of a rehearsal studio at my own Oberlin College insists that 
9The term 'autoanthropology' refers to anthropology done in the 
home culture, the use of anthropological method to better 
understand ourselves (whoever 'ourselves' may be in each 
particular case). Schneider (1968) and Ortiz, among others, 
introduced the practice in the 60's. Its importance was brought 
home for me by a class that Vern Carroll taught in 
anthropological theory. 
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no actor ever negatively represent the theatrical enterprise to 
those outside of it. At the New Jersey Shakespeare Festival, 
where I once spent four months, director Paul Barry set dietary 
laws, dress codes and language restrictions (the forbiddance of 
commercial references and advertisements, for example) and held 
regular social events to promote esprit-de-corps. 
It could be argued, of course, that such examples show 
allegiance primarily to the subgroup and only secondarily (if at 
all) to the group as a whole. My experience in the New York 
area belies this claim: 
certain microrituals (to contrast them with the macrorituals 
that theater performs qua religion in the wider society) 
serve to promote group solidarity even among the unemployed. 
The audition circuit, for one, gives actors an almost daily 
chance to see the same people and reaffirm their commitment 
to the enterprise; certain occupations, such as waitering 
(especially for catering companies) and word processing are 
actor-heavy, and certain firms hire solely or primarily 
actors, mainly through advertisements in the theater trade 
magazine, Backstage; the Off-Off Broadway complex, a series 
of unpaid showcases serves as a stepping stone for many 
unemployed actors; finally, superstitions (such as not 
saying 'Macbeth' aloud, not wearing green) and language 
(theater lingo) further strengthen group solidarity. 
(1986b:10-11) 
But the most potent of unifiers and the clearest example of 
theater's group nature remains the actual poiesis of the 
macrorituals themselves--rehearsals and performances. Describing 
his experiences with the postmodern theater of Richard Schechner 
and others, victor Turner relates: 
It involves innumerable workshop sessions, some lasting for 
hours, others all night, in which breathing exercises, voice 
workshops, ingenious games, psycho-dramas, dancing, aspects 
of yoga •.• represent components. All these disciplines and 
ordeals are aimed at generating communitas or something like 
it in the group. (1982:119) 
Turner's experience doesn't stand alone. In Between Theater and 
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Anthropology, Schechner identifies six essential "points of 
contact" between 
the theatrical method and significant anthropological 
observations concerning ritual: Transformation of Being 
and/or Consciousness; Intensity of Performance; Audience-
Performer Interactions; The Whole Performance Sequence; 
Transmission of Performance Knowledge; How Performances are 
Generated and Evaluated. (Freiman 1986c:3, based on 
Schechner 1985:6) 
Following Turner and Schechner, then, theater stands clearly as a 
group, and one tending towards liminality and communitas. But 
before matching up the theater and Turner's (unexplained) Gestalt 
of liminal characteristics, I want to demonstrate theater's 
fundamental process-orientation. 
Postmodern American theater divides process from product, 
the growing from the plant. Process represents the flow of the 
rehearsal period (itself almost always referred to as the 
rehearsal process)--the developing, the flowing, the creating; 
product represents that flow frozen over--developed characters, 
creation complete. And most importantly, process is emphasized. 
Characters can only become 'real' (and that is the word used), 
actors and directors insist, if the actor immerses himself in the 
flow of process. Any attempt to fashion a character, to focus on 
the end product, the final form, ultimately reduces to 
presentational, false theater, Stanislavski's "exaggerated false 
acting." 
Improvisation, a hallmark of American theater from 
Vaudeville to Second city, also strongly reinforces the process-
epistemology. Without words, without routines, without plot, in 
other words without any reified tools, actors must react, immerse 
themselves in the doing of acting. No possibility for end 
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product focus, no way to thingify the flow, exists. As a major 
activity of the American rehearsal process as well as an actual 
performance (from 'parfournir, OF "to complete", indicating a 
still-going-on-process) component or style, improvisation ranks 
process as the dominant way of seeing. 
Perhaps most importantly, the very method of creating a 
character rests fundamentally on an active notion of process, 
both in postmodern theater and in American theater in general. 
One of the central steps that an actor uses in creating a 
character (in addition to improvisation) is the analysis of the 
script for a set of character objectives. Logically extended, 
this theory holds that each individual is driven by a set of 
intentions. The actor formulates these expressions in the form 
of active desires. 
Trofimov in The Cherry Orchard, for instance, might phrase 
his objective in the famous "All Russia is our orchard" scene as 
"I want to impress Anya." The actor playing Trofimov would then 
strive in the course of the scene to re-act to Anya in terms of 
this intention. Never would he try to play "being sad" or "being 
intelligent" or being anything stative. The essense of good 
acting, or creating a 'real' character, is to do, not to be, to 
react, not to act. An actor who tries to play states, nouns, or 
adjectives like 'in control' or 'intellectual' or 'happy' dooms 
himself to "exaggerated false acting"; an actor who cleaves to 
verbs, who plays the scene trying to impress Anya, his focus on 
her, will succeed. 
This approach emphasizes the relating, the fragile current 
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of connection between the actors on stage. This, it is believed, 
more honestly represents the actual people who live their lives 
in dynamic flux with others and their environment and not as 
static isolates, with reducable, listable characteristics. 
The way that actors and directors use 'real' and 'false' 
shows how deeply imbedded process-epistemology is in theater. 
An actor who devotes herself totally to pursuing her objectives 
during a scene, rigidly fixing her attention on the flux, the 
process, is considered to have created a 'real' character. An 
actor who, to the contrary, focuses on attributes and emotions, 
who makes sure to show her anger and her irk, no matter how 
stirring and powerful is still considered to have engaged in 
'false' acting. 
A process-epistemology focused on action should, like the 
Navajo, reverse the degree-of-reality ranking of the earth-air 
dichotomy. Theater continues this pattern. certain 'types' of 
actors are labelled "sprites" and "nymphs". "The muse" often 
sUbstitutes for "theatrical inspiration." certainly none of 
these terms refer to tangible, earthbound creatures. And 
ritually, actors cannot rest shoes on the dressing/make-up 
tables. A sociobiologist or fundamental functionalist might yell 
"cleanliness control," but as an interpretivist I see a 
prohibition that insures the representative of the base earth, 
shoes, staying away from the launching pad of the art's reality. 
Many outside of theater don't consider theater real 
at all, but think of it as a temporary vacation from reality, a 
brief dream-flight away from the gravity-tiring ground. That may 
explain some of the thing-ers air-name calling (see below). It 
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also poses a problem for ascribing epistemology. Can something 
not itself real have a distinctive way of seeing the real? 
To answer that question, it's important to return to the 
native's point of view (Geertz 1983:55-73). As I've argued 
elsewhere (1986a) from a philosophical perspective, stage 
characters are just as real as non-stage ones. Which is just to 
stand Hamlet on his head: all the world's a stage and we are 
merely players, backwards. But whether I'm right or not isn't 
important here; the significance rests with the fact that native 
theorists (myself among them) have expounded the belief that 
theater is real. And even those who do not hold such radical 
ontololgical beliefs (after all, a culture doesn't always agree 
with its native philosophers) db believe in the reality of the 
rehearsal process--its ability to reveal personal truths, to 
create genuine communitas. The outsiders argument, then, that 
theater isn't real, breaks down from the inside. 10 Modern 
American theater believes that it is real, and has located that 
reality in the world of process. 
Before I move into the terrain of physics, I want to show 
the fit between American theater's process-epistemology and 
Turner's list of liminal attributes. "Fairy," for example, an 
ungrounded creature, is a derogatory term applied to a certain 
perceived category of gay men, those often considered effeminate 
and "theatrical." That would be expected by process's general 
lOEven if theater is conceived of as play (note the homonym), the 
unreal-ascription still holds: play is 'make-believe', i.e., not 




reversal of the earth-air dichotomy. But it also ties in closely 
to Turner's model. "Theater," your average citizen will inform 
you, "has a lot more homosexuals than most professions." That 
may be true of not (more men may simply be open about it): if it 
is not, then the assumption may be a distance device (taboo?) to 
prevent contact (M. Douglas 1966); if it is true it could relate 
to the association of liminals with structural inferiors and 
marginals (here women) or with Turner's "minimization of sex 
differences." That in turn may connect with the liminals's 
tendency to avoid patterns of structurally 'normal' sexual 
relations. Very few actors, to continue the correlation, get or 
stay married. Which may in its turn go back to the public's 
general perception of actors as more orgy-prone than, say, 
accountants. The causality isn't at all clear, but the 
correlation is: actor/liminal as gay/female/unmarried/orgy-
prone; regular American as straight/male/married/orgy-Iess. 
unmarried people, especially those engaged in (or perceived 
to be engaged in) orgies tend to be more ensemble-oriented. 
Actually, the ensemble is one of the clear markers of modern 
American theater. Several of Turner's elements of the liminal 
Gestalt click into place under the ensemble-matrix: "equality" 
and "absence of status"--all roles are of eqaual significance; 
"homogeneity"--any actor can play any part in many ensemble 
shows; "communitas"; and "anonymity"--an actor 'gets into 
character' and leaves the old idiosyncratic self behind. l1 
110f course, actors aren't actors all the time. 
delineating this analysis to the times when they 
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although I am 
are actors, a 
Leaving the old self behind leads into a second clustering 
of liminal attributes: what I call the no-self matrix. 
"Unselfishness," the first of the group, manifests itself in 
theater through both the ensemble dedication to "the process" 
over and above any individual ego and the well-worn saw that "the 
show must go on." Shows going on means people sometimes don't. 
At least that was the message forcefully presented to me at the 
New Jersey Shakespeare Festival when the director retold a tale 
of a past season when a blood-gushing wounded soldier bound his 
cut, stepped back into the fray and finished the swordfight and 
the show before being rushed to the hospital and sewn up. 
"Acceptance of pain and suffering" clearly belongs to the no-self 
complex. Similarly theater not only tolerates but encourages 
"foolishness," a necessary attribute of creativity, particularly 
during improvisations. The final link, "total obedience," 
represents one of the more interesting (and politically 
important) elements of the anti-structure complex. The director, 
like some Ndembu puberty group supervisor, decides: when the 
actor has bled enough, if the show will go on, how foolish to be, 
etc. 
Absolute power, in turn, relates to "sacredness." Although 
a recounting of evidence about the insiders's beliefs on the 
sacredness of the theater is too lengthy for this format, I've 
paranthetical point may be in order. Actors, far more than say 
accountants, tend to define themselves by profession. The 
creation and presentation of self for an actor often rests on the 
acting. 
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documented it elsewhere (1986b). For a taste of it, though, I 
quote the following from Julian Beck's The Life of the Theater 
(1972#30) : 
... the theatre principally is the dancing place of the 
people 
and therefore the dancing place of the gods who dance 
in ecstasy only amid the people 
And therefore we aim this theatre at God 
and the people 
who are the destination of the most holy 
holy holy revolution. 
with sacredness comes "sacred instruction." Barry stands as a 
prominent example. He insisted that theater is religion, a 
statement that I accepted until I realized he meant it literally. 
In a letter he later sent me, Barry asserted that God sent 
different prophets to different people at different times and 
implied that he and his theater carry God's message to New Jersey 
today. That message, and with it the sacred instruction on how 
to pass it along, are hedged about by the ritual circumscriptions 
that I noted earlier. And with both Beck and Barry's assertions 
of theatrical sacredness and their methods of sacred instruction 
(recall the Oberlin theater's code of ethics prohibiting 
revealing anything negative about the art) comes Turner's 
"continual reference to mystical powers." I mentioned the muse 
earlier, the avoidance of the mention of Macbeth, and I cite 
once more Schechner's (1985) points of contact between ritual and 
theater, many of which are suffused throughout with continual 
reference to the divine. 
Present-tenseness and simplicity represent the final two 
striking correlations between Turner's liminal list and the 
theater. "Living in the moment" stands as one of the most 
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important of the actor's dicta, a central organizing direction 
for emphasizing the need to concentrate on the relating mentioned 
above. The opposite of living in the moment, thinking of a part 
of the scene to come, the lines about to be said, the way the 
last five minutes went, etc., is the path straight to false 
acting, theater's greatest taboo. Similarly, simplicity is 
mandated. While constructing the objectives (see above) an actor 
strives to use simple (generaly one or two syllable) verbs that 
relate directly to the other actor(s) on stage or to the 
environment. Any attempt to over-intellectualize the character's 
motivations, including to attempt to fix those motivations in 
memories or aspirations (past or future), is also believed to 
lead to false acting. Which doesn't mean an actor doesn't take 
character history into account while discovering the motivations, 
just that once the simple one-line one-verb one-object 
motivations are discovered every effort is made to play them "in 
the moment." A fact that once again hearkens back to Hopi, to 
the no-tense world of process, to the anti-thing camp. And in 
this battalion (although not in the Hopi's one) to anti-structure 
and institutionalized liminality. 




If theater represents institutionalized liminality, the 
ritual stage encased in modernity's lamination and left 
on the mantle, then modern American physics is the laminating 
machine running down, modernity entering the postmodern world. 
In the centuries since the advent of modernity, western 
culture has poured more and more of its epistemological duties 
into the mouth of science. It has been argued that Newton paved 
the way for a godless era, that the ramifications of the 
integrated mechanics led to the Great Machine and its at-least 
Deist conclusions. Whether we can accept such a profound 
causality is questionable. But in the hundreds of years since 
Newton, physics has substantially increased its prestige-ranking 
in the philosophical world. Scores of books and articles, for 
instance, have been written on the effects of quantum theory and 
relativity to the worlds of philosophy, psychology, information 
theory, and even literary theory (see Meyerson, Capek, Stapp). 
Harold Puthoff and Russell Targ of the Stanford Research 
Institute have even attempted to apply quantum theories to such 
occult fields as telepathy and remote viewing. 
As physics has come to be regarded as one of the 
epistemological inquirers par excellence, it has also internally 
solidified. Regardless of the flow to and from the outside 
culture, physics has through the years fashioned an increasingly 
self-consistent symbolic world. Although it might be going too 
far to assert that physics now represents a culture separate from 
its host, its autonomy is marked. 
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Several occurences on the modern scene make this clear. For 
one, much of modern science occurs in an international setting, 
across nations and continents, cultures and culture groups. 
Although national styles of focus and emphasis may differ 
drastically (see Vucinich), an integrated whole clearly exists. 
Academia has not been ignorant of this trend. Although 
mainstream sociology and anthropology have for the most part 
regrettably neglected the study of science, separate departments 
in the history, sociology and philosophy of science have sprung 
up at a number of universities. The university of Pennsylvania, 
a leader in the field, now publishes a regular journal devoted to 
the history and sociology of science, Isis. 
All of which is not surprising. Although Kuhn did not use 
the word, he clearly analyzed the manner in which distinct 
subcultures can and do appear through science. As a paradigm 
develops in a field, the scientists become less likely to write 
for a general public and more likely to write in a way that will 
only be understood within their group. The symbol system 
expands, but only extends to those within the narrow confines of 
the paradigm. 
But although this 'culturality' may not be surprising, it 
could be troubling. Not troubling because of its distance from 
the host culture; as I have noted above discourse continues to 
flow strongly, particularly in the epistemological arena. But if 
modern physics represents something of an internal international 
subculture, then how can I analyze its epistemological 
relationship vis-a-vis America? 
The notion of national styles that I mentioned above 
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provides the beginning of an answer. Modern physics as a 
discipline and a quasi-separate cultural world may be available 
to everyone from a Vietnamese fisherman to a Tallensi farmer, but 
significantly, very few of them ever do choose to take it up. 
outside of a small group of 'western' nations composed of the 
United states, Britain, west Germany, France and a few others, 
physicists are few and far between. Furthermore, those few 
Tallensi or vietnamese who do choose to become physicists almost 
always attend schools located in that small group of western 
countries, beginning the process of acculturation both inside and 
outside the physics labs. 
But to say that modern physics resides in the western world 
is not to prove its distinctive Americanness as regards 
epistemology. That is a proof I cannot give. As a somewhat 
detatched subculture developed in the international cauldron of a 
few western nations, physics remains more autonomous than most of 
the subcultures with which the dominant American culture 
interacts. 
As I remarked in an earlier footnote, the distinction 
between American epistemology and some broader culture group 
(whether it be the generic 'western culture', MacCannell's 
'modern culture', Whorf's 'SAE', or the linguists's 'Indo-
European') is itself a difficult distinction to.make. Obviously, 
many similarities exist between America and Britain, America and 
Germany, even America and France, and those similarities may 
include elements of a shared epistemology. Nevertheless, as I am 
confined by limitations of knowledge, resources, time and space, 
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I have chosen to focus on the culture which for me is most 
accessible, the one I know best. For that reason my units of 
analysis derive mainly from America, although an occasional 
citation from the Oxford English Dictionary may muddle the 
picture. 
If that problem holds for American epistemology in general, 
it particularly holds for the world of physics. Which is not to 
say that I've given up on detailing a specifically American 
subculture of physics when it comes to the interaction between 
the dominant thing-epistemology and quantum physics. In the last 
thirty years quantum physics, and particularly the philosophical 
elucidations of quantum physics by physicists, has come to be 
more of a strongly American enterprise. This may be explained by 
institutional structure, resources, and so on, but even if that 
is true the connection between culture and institutional strength 
represents an important subfield of the sociology of science that 
cannot so easily be dismissed. 
Furthermore, those quantum physicists who have recently 
come from outside the United states often come from two of the 
nations most closely related, etymologically and politically, 
with us: Great Britain and west Germany. The epistemological 
link between these three countries may be more than incidental: 
as once the German language helped give birth to English by 
crossing the Channel, so German scientists of the twentienth 
century (many of whom eventually came to live in this country) 
helped give birth to quantum physics by crossing the Atlantic. 
In the pages that are to follow, I'll focus mainly on the 
American children of those 'western' (or 'modern' or 'SAE' or 
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whatever) parents, the scientists of the Lawrence Berkeley Lab, 
Georgia Tech, the Institute for Advanced study, and other centers 
of the particularly American modern physics. And it is those 
very physicists, the Americans, whose contributions represent 
some of the most exciting (in American terms) epistemological 
work of this century inside or out or physics. 
* * * 
The geography of quantum physics's epistemology is dotted 
with concepts seemingly foreign in the realm of science--
mysterious cities of nothingness, plains of process, valleys of 
holism and forests of experientialism--landmarks that would seem 
more fitting on an LSD trip or in the philosophical world of a 
Mahayana Buddhist. 
It seems as if I've already left that land, already 
abandoned the insider's point of view. Just by breaking up 
quantum physics's epistemology into pieces like 'nothingness' and 
'process', I've negated the very holism around which much of 
quantum physics hovers, the idea that no thing exists 
independently, that all of the universe patterns, that it is one. 
But in another way I've found the land, adopted the native's 
practices as my own, for although physicists may yearn to finally 
prove that unbroken unity, they speak along the way of mesons and 
positrons, the weak force and the sixth dimension. Those very 
unreal (their term) constructs, the things which do not in any 
way truly exist, themselves provide the path to holism. In much 
the same way, .I hope my unfair constructs, the buckets into which 
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I've sorted my knowledge, provide the path to quantum physics's 
unsortable epistemology. 
* * * 
"Commonsense contradictions are at the heart of the new 
physics," says Gary Zukav, author of a recent novice's guide 
to the field. That's not surprising. In fact, it means we're on 
the right track towards a counter-epistemology. Common sense, as 
Geertz has shown, provides the last-ditch defense of cultural 
values, the system into which the very basics are poured (see 
also Yinger 1982). To counter common sense, then, as modern 
physics does, counters culture. The mutation is in the pool. 
If anyone feature of this new mutation stands out among the 
rest, if any seems to organize them all, that feature is 
nothingness. Henry stapp of the Lawrence Berkeley Lab has 
put it clearly: 
If the attitude of quantum mechanics is correct, in the 
strong sense that a description of the substructure 
underlying experience more complete than the one it provides 
is not possible, then there is no sUbstantive physical world 
in the usual sense of this term. (stapp n.d., cited in 
Zukav 1979: 105) 
As stapp's quote shows, nothingness has a sidekick, namely 
experiential ism. 
stapp himself does not believe that quantum mechanics's 
descriptions are ultimately complete. That completeness theorem, 
the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics led by Niels 
Bohr, states that quantum mechanics measures our experiences, not 
some observable "out there" beyond our reach. Probabilities and 
aggregates are physics's domain, the interpretation holds, not 
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absolute explanations of individual events. 12 stapp, rejecting 
that hypothesis, believes that models of reality are possible. 
He believes in superluminal connections, in the relativistically 
impossible transfer of knowledge faster than the speed of light, 
in the implications that holds of a universal organicism, an all-
pervading unity. 
Which all sounds very mystical. And very confusing. But at 
its heart, the stapp-Copenhagen dispute represents a simple 
debate fought over a simply startling question: Is the universe 
founded on fundamental nothingness, or is it ultimately of one 
piece, a God-like supercreature communicating with itself? 
Although much of America would prefer it, modern physics 
does not provide a "none of the above" answer. only two choices 
exist, both of which provide radical challenges to the dominant 
American thing-epistemology: nothingness and superunity.13 
12The Copenhagen here provides an interesting parallel with Henry 
James's American pragmatism. James held that the mind deals with 
ideas, that it can't ponder reality itself, just ideas about 
reality. In his view, truth is the match-up to experience, not 
to some absolute reality. 
Lakoff and Johnson would emphatically agree. 
neurophysiology, which posits that the brain 
from nerves, never actually experiencing any 
directly. 
So, it seems, would 
receives signals 
element of reality 
13Actually, two other options are given, both of which occupy 
extremely marginal positions in modern physics. The first, the 
Many Worlds Theory, posits that every time more than one 
possibility exists and only one occurs, the others actually occur 
in alternate universes. In the Schrodinger's cat example, for 
instance, the cat both dies and lives, even after the 
experimenter's observation. If the observer sees a living cat, 
the cat died in another universe, etc. The second position, 
superdeterminism, holds that each interaction occurs exactly as 
it must; there is no choice, no probability, no anything except a 
blind, ultimate, predestined fate. Both of these theories are 
built around the assumptions that l)models of reality are 
possible (contra the Copenhagen interpretation), and 2)locality 
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Nothingness, no-thing-ness, suffuses many areas of modern 
quantum physics. Modern Big Bang theory, for instance, put 
forward by Alan Guth (then of Stanford), postulates that the 
universe was born out of nothingness. Not some infinitely 
massive, compact pinhead of matter as was once believed, but no-
thing-ness: 
[T]he whole system of the world--space, time, matter--all 
seem to have sprung into existence from nothing. "I have 
often heard it said that there is no such thing as free 
lunch. It now appears possible that the universe itself is 
a free lunch," said Alan Guth, the creator of the 
inflationary theory. The universe indeed seems to have come 
from the vacuum; i.e., from nothing. (Szamosi 1986: 248) 
Inflationary theory holds that a false vacuum (a vacuum somewhere 
above the lowest energy state) repulsed itself, causing a 
superluminal expansion of spacetime which increased the energy in 
the universe. After expanding, the universe settled down to a 
true vacuum. Nothing was excited, it burped, the universe was 
born, and then nothing relaxed. 
Which is almost exactly analogous to another part of quantum 
physics, particle interactions. Just as the nothing emitted the 
universe and then relaxed to a lower energy state, so an electron 
emits a photon and drops to a lower energy level. But the 
electron itself was born of the same nothingness that the photon 
was. Quantum electrodynamics (S-Matrix theory in particular) 
holds (there are discrete parts of the universe, contra Stapp), 
so that both conclude that contra factual definiteness fails. 
Although the first of these (the Everett-Graham-Wheeler 
hypothesis) is occasionally discussed in physics, the second is 
more often considered metaphysical. (Zukav 1979:320) 
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holds that particles themselves are merely "intermediate steps 
in a network of interactions" (Zukav 1979: 266). Feynman vacuum 
drawings, the product of American physicist Richard Feynman, 
describe interactions in the following way: 
[Wlhere there was no-thing, suddenly, in a flash of 
spontaneous existence, there are three particles which 
vanish without a trace. (Zukav 1979:257) 
Nothing gives something, which returns to being nothing. 
This no-thing-ness central to quantum physics has its root 
with other elements of the new physics, particularly relativity. 
Einstein's great E=mc2 showed, epistemologically, that no 
essential distinction exists between energy (process) and matter 
(thing). Particle mass, for instance, is now measured in terms 
of electron volts, an energy measure. Thing is understood in 
terms of process, a situation reminiscent of the Navajo 
epistemology's inactive as marked state of the active. Process 
is paramount. As Zukav puts it, mass is "energy of being." 
Two final examples of physics's essential no-thing-ness 
should hammer the point home. First, particle spin, one of the 
essential determinants of a particle's identity, involves "The 
idea of a spin without the existence of something spinning ... " 
(Born 1951:206, cited in Zukav 1979:227). Second, the 
electromagnetic force14 , which is understood at least partially as 
a wave, is itself irreducible. It doesn't wave through anything; 
it just waves (Zukav 1979:151-156). The way particle spin spins 
without spinning, electromagnetic waves wave without waving. 
14More properly, the electroweak force, which is one of the three 
basic (i.e., as yet undeconstructed) forces of the universe. 
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spinning and waving are what matters, not what spins or waves. 
If the proof of physics's preoccupation with nothingness 
seems to have led to a discussion of the paramounce of process, 
good. That's where we're going next. Subatomic particles, as it 
turns out, have never been seen. Not even by an electron 
microscope. Like rabbits after the first snow, the only evidence 
we have of them are the tracks they leave behind. Their effects 
on photographic plates, their remnants of action, point the way. 
This reliance on action-not-object for the proof of physics's 
most fundamental theories reveals just how deeply process is 
embedded in the field's epistemology. Spinning, waving, and 
tracking. 
The evidence continues to pile up. Particle physicists 
refer to particle-smashing experiments as "resonance hunting" 
experiments, since particles are understood primarily as 
resonances--interactions of energy fields (Cole 1987:24). As 
Zukav puts it: 
If there is any ultimate stuff of the universe, it is 
pure energy, but subatomic particles are not "made of" 
energy, they ~ energy .•.. Subatomic interactions, 
therefore, are interactions of energy with energy. At the 
subatomic level there is no longer a clear distinction 
between what is and what happens, between the actor and the 
action. (1979:212) 
Finkelstein's (Georgia) theory of quantum topology takes the 
current state of particle understanding and pushes it to its 
radical-process end: 
[Tlhe basic unit of the universe is an event. or a process. 
These events link in certain ways (allowed transitions) to 
form webs. The webs in turn join to form larger webs. 
Farther up the laaaer of organization are coherent 




string theory (or superstring, as it is sometimes called) pushes 
Finkelstein even farther, by tying both the particle and the 
cosmological ends of quantum physics together. Edward witten 
of the Institute for Advanced study in Princeton, the principal 
proponent of the theory, holds that the universe is composed of 
strings. Not strings as in kites or cheese, but unobservable 
mathematical curves. Some 'fundamental stuff' makes up those 
curves, and that 'stuff' is generally considered to be spacetime. 
Empty space and empty time. Nothing. No-thing-ness. And those 
loops of nothingness vibrate, that is, engage in an ongoing 
process, to create the ongoing illusion of things. Calling the 
illusory particles "points [of interaction]", K.C. Cole describes 
superstring this way: 
[S]tring theory is proposing that these points, in fact, are 
tiny loops, or closed "strings," .... The strings, too, 
vibrate invisibly in subtle resonances. These vibrations, 
so the theory goes, make up everything in the universe. 
Imagine a closed string--a loop--of some kind of 
fundamental stuff. Now imagine that the loop rotates, 
twists and vibrates ..•. As the loop wriggles, it resonates 
in many different modes, like a 10-dimensional violin string 
sending out cosmic versions of A or E flat. These 
vibrations ... determine all the possible particles and forces 
of the universe. (1987:22-23) 
Witten, obviously, has pushed far beyond the Copenhagen 
interpretation's assertion that no models of reality are 
possible. He represents in many ways the fallout of Bell's 
theorem, a 1964 mathematical proof that either the statistical 
predictions of quantum mechanics are incorrect or the principle 
of local causes fails. When the Clauser-Freedman experiment 
(Berkeley) verified beyond a doubt the correctness of quantum 
mechanics's statistical predictions, the house fell through. If 
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you assume models of reality are possible (contra Copenhagen), 
then local causes must fail. 15 
Jack Sarfatti in 1975 proposed that the universe is 
connected intimately with itself, in a way that transcends both 
space and time. The universe connects with itself, Sarfatti 
theorized, by a "superluminal transfer of negentropy 
(information) without signals" (Zukav 1979:310). In this theory, 
no thing moves; "Nonetheless, there is an 'instantaneous' change 
in the quality (coherent structure) of the energy in both 
areas ... " (IBID). 
Sarfatti's radical theory of superunity, although not widely 
accepted, follows rather directly from much of the legacy of 
quantum physics. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, for 
instance, originally showed that either the momentum or the 
position of a particle, but not both, can be determined by an 
experiment. Heisenberg essentially destroyed the old concept of 
'observer'. The scientist in some way 'creates' the world, since 
her interaction affects results: she chooses whether to find a 
particle with position or a particle with momentum. Discovery 
after discovery, theory after theory later verified this radical 
epistemological switch. 16 This led to a myriad of metaphysical 
15Zakov: "The principle of local causes says that what happens in 
one area does not depend upon variables subject to the control of 
an experimenter in a distant space-like separated area. The 
principle of local causes is common sense. The results of an 
experiment in a place distant and space-like separated from us 
should not depend on what we decide to do or not to do right 
here"(1979:304). 
16Zakov believes that our dominant American epistemology asserts 
the fundamental separateness of objects and events. This, he 
holds, represents part of our sense of separateness from others 
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questions: 
May the universe in some strange sense be 'brought into 
being' by the participation of those who participate? .. The 
vital act is the act of participation. 'Participator' is 
the incontrovertible new concept given by quantum mechanics. 
It strikes down the term 'observer' of classical theory, the 
man who stands safely behind the thick glass wall and 
watches what goes on without taking part. It can't be 
done, quantum mechanics says. (Wheeler et aI, cited in 
Zakov 1979:54) 
Such speculations, represented above by a prominent Princeton 
physicist, led to questions about the process of 'studying'. A 
particle's isolation, its separateness from the universal 
environment, itself is a physicist-created idealization. One 
significant viewpoint derived from that fact holds that 
quantum mechanics allows us to idealize a photon from the 
fundamental unbroken unity so that we can study it. In 
fact, a 'photon' seems to become isolated from the 
fundamental unbroken unity because we are studying it. 
(Zukav 1979:95) 
Sarfatti created his superholism theory from this important 
tradition, physics's central epistemological tenet of an 
interactive, holistic, self-creating universe. 
In the final analysis, I must pour the analytic buckets back 
into the pool, put Humpty-Dumpty back together again. Pushing 
him off the wall, breaking modern physics's epistemology into 
parts, represented the arbitrary act, the act contrary to the 
insiders's own epistemology. But just as they separate 
and from the environment of which we are a part. His belief 
melds well with the picture of a thing-bound dominant American 
epistemology that fixes itself in a world of separate objects. 
The theory also produces interesting ramifications when combined 
with Bellah et aI, Bateson, and Lakoff and Johnson. 
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'particles' from the fundamental unbroken unity so that they can 
study it, I separate (and so in some way create) elements of a 
prevailing counterepistemology so that I can study it, and in a 
particularly physics-like twist, its interaction with the 
dominant American epistemology of thinghood. As they dream of a 
simple mathematical expression to describe the fundamental 
unbroken unity, the essential no-thing-ness, I dream of a single 
simple sentence that could convey the world of no-thing, holism, 
experiential ism, process and reality-creation that is modern 
physics. We'll both have to wait. 
* * * 
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FEMINISM 
If physics stands as a shining example of a mainstream group 
awarded the authority to make profound epistemological inquiries, 
then feminism represents the other side: the marginals, never 
thought worthy to entertain philosophical thoughts, demanding the 
right and authority to make their particular epistemological 
views heard. Physics was the good old boys gone bad, feminism 
isn't good, old, or boys. Just, according to the thing-
epistemology, bad. 
To call this section an inquiry into the epistemological 
beliefs of feminism is a misnomer. Feminism is a blanket term, 
covering everything from support for equal wages to the espousal 
of radical pedagogic techniques. Unlike theater and physics, no 
schools. exist to pass on the paradigm, no structural system 
sustains its members. 1 Which should, in and of itself, intrigue. 
The first two examples in this chapter have been structure-bound 
groups, theater as an encapsulated ritual, physics as an actually 
mainstream structural group promulgating subversive epistemo-
logical beliefs. But feminism, structureless, represents 
the first liminal on Turner's model, a group of people .excluded 
from the social structure. 
But more than Turner's model of a knee-jerk opposition to 
the structure it is excluded from, feminism provides an example 
IFeminists do involve themselves in structure in many ways, 
particularly politico-legal structures and institutionalized 
academic structures. Nevertheless the determining feature of 
their involvement is their marginality, their opposition to the 
structure and its patriarchal epistemological biases. 
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of one of the first conscious counter-epistemologies in the 
modern era. Aware of the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis (although not 
necessarilly accepting it in toto), feminism has made bold 
attempts to reformulate language, both syntactically and 
semantically. Similarly, aware of the modernist and 
postmodernist debates over form and function, feminism has 
realized the hidden transferral of values implicit in classic 
pedagogy and set out to reform those teaching methods. 
Although ignoring political, legal, and minority aspects of 
feminism is to paint a skewed picture, I do not aim to paint at 
all. It is not an isolate, feminism, which I hope to portray, 
but rather a relationship, the interaction between feminism's 
self-conscious epistemology (or rather parts of feminism's self-
conscious epistemology) and the dominant American (male) model. 
For this reason, I will focus on those self-aware theorizers, the 
pedagogues and linguists. 2 
Idealized pedagogical methods of feminist theory differ 
2It is essential to realize that these theories are not always 
generally accepted, either in the structure world as a whole or 
even inside the feminist discourse. The epistemological 
explanations of aesthetics and generalized writing styles are by 
no means unquestioned. Nor are the suggestions for a new 
aesthetic made or inferred by Penelope and Wolf, Stein, Millet, 
donovan, etc. always followed. 
But for the purposes of this study, these facts are not 
important. As a self-conscious self-creating epistemology, 
feminism's conscious creations are important, particularly the 
attempts to create and identify a distinctive way of seeing the 
world. Whether what these writers say is generizable to women as 
a whole proves insignificant in an analysis of feminist 
epistemology. 
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radically from standard classroom tecnique. The rotating chair, 
for instance, is to the socratic method what Thomas Jefferson's 
dream is to King George. Instead of a single teacher controlling 
the agenda and deciding who may and may not speak, each member 
(student or teacher) chooses the next speaker, and the agenda is 
shaped collectively rather than hierarchically. 
Feminism's emphasis on interdisciplinary studies represents 
another attack on the structurtally standard ways of academia. 
Institutions, it is believed, and with them the institutionalized 
divisions of knowledge into departments and fields, derive from 
the patriarchal hegemonic structure and as such help to pass it 
along. Although each discipline or field may have acquired 
important knowledge, a student can best acquire that knowledge by 
approaching it from an interdisciplinary angle, by standing 
outside of the rigid structure. 
The emphasis on democratization and standing outside the 
structure in feminist pedagogy manifests itself as one of 
feminist literary criticism's most potent concerns: the role and 
plight of the marginal. In "Madwoman in the Attic," a classic of 
feminist literary theory, Gilbert and Gubar assert the necessity 
of paying attention not only to the obviously important Jane 
Eyre, but also to the minor characters whose lives have often 
been overlooked or brushed aside. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern 
may be dead, but only because we haven't paid much attention to 
them. 
If feminism demands bringing minor characters back into the 
fold, understanding as marginals ourselves that they too have 
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been overlooked and ignored, then it demands also that 'minor' 
authors be re-dis-covered. The canon must be de-canonized. The 
aesthetic endemic to the patrimony must be expanded at least, 
perhaps rejected. Standards must be revolutionized. Women's 
(and other minorities's) miniscule printing history represents 
not merely a lack of access to the means of production, but a 
fundamentally exclusionary process. Reinterpreting our 
standards, going back over diaries, letters and romance novels 
once disparaged and seeing them in a new light, provides one of 
the first steps towards revolutionizing the dominant aesthetic 
standards. 
The advocates of a distinctive women's writing style, like 
the literary theorists, begin with the recognition of the 
connections between aesthetics, epistemology, and language. As 
Penelope and Wolfe say: 
We must wrestle with English in our efforts to remake it as 
a language adequate to our conceptual processes. From 
Virginia Woolf and Gertrude stein to Kate Millet and Susan 
Griffin, the relationship between consciousness and 
linguistic choice is confronted, played with, and 
articulated as the self expressing itself in and through a 
language remade, reordered: the feminist aesthetic. 
(1983:135) 
Their quote of Josephine Donovan (1975:78) states the matter 
consummately: 
[A]esthetic judgments are rooted in epistemology: one cannot 
understand why someone thinks something is beautiful or 
significant until one understands the way slhe sees, knows 
the world. 
The counter-epistemology that feminist literary theorists 
would like to create fits well within Turner's liminal Gestalt. 
Gertrude Stein, for example, extols the virtues of the present 
tense. She speaks of the need for a new tense which she calls 
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'present immediacy' that she believes should be the foundation 
stone for story writing. Her consciousness of the role of 
language and her attempt to reformulate American English in 
terms of holism provides an intriguing example of liminal 
attributes: 
[T]he 'internal history' of a country always affects its use 
of writing. It makes a difference in the expression, in the 
vocabulary, even in the handling of grammar .... I had this 
conception of the whole paragraph .... I had this idea of the 
whole thing ... They conceive of it as pieces put together to 
make a whole, and I conceived it as a whole made up of its 
parts ... the element of punctuation was very vital. The 
comma was just a nuisance. If you got the thing as a whole 
and the comma keeps sticking out, it gets on your nerves; 
because, after all, it destroys the reality of the whole. 
So I got rid more and more of commas .... That is the 
illustration of grammar and parts of speech, as part of the 
daily life as we live it. (1974:153) 
If Stein illustrates well the 'totality' aspect of Turner's 
liminal state, Maud Haimson represents the anti-bounding bias 
expected by a counter-epistemology in my dominant thing-system. 
In her short story, "Hands", characters don't have regular, fixed 
names. Instead, their names evolve ecologically, as a part of 
the context: 
The cave woman picked up a small rock, touched it all 
around, and brought it to the older woman. The older 
outside woman took it, touched it and holding it asked the 
inside woman if she'd been outside. The stone woman shook 
her head and taking a look at her stove picked up some rocks 
and put them in her many pocketed cloth-like thing going to 
the ground, pockets in the back too with bulges from stones. 
She followed the other woman out. (1975:60, cited in 
Penelope and Wolfe 1983:127) 
And once again antibounding links with experiential ism; as 
Penelope and Wolf note, 
[W]hat she wears is more than a product, or material object, 
or categorized, fixed label .... It has characteristics, but 
it too is engaged in the processes connected with its being 
and functions. (1983:127) 
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stein believes that the processes of writing must be 
included in the writing itself, that a written object isn't an 
object, but the record of a process. Her preference for verbs 
and adverbs, like the Navajo and Hopi preference, reveals her 
inclination towards the process-epistemology: 
In the Making of Americans a long a very long prose 
book made up of sentences and paragraphs and the new thing 
that was something neither the sentences nor the paragraph 
each one alone or in combination had ever done, I said I had 
gotten rid of nouns and adjectives as much as possible by 
the method of living in adverbs in verbs in pronouns, in 
adverbial clauses written or implied and in conjunctions. 
(cited in Penelope and Wolf 1983:129) 
Verbs of action, conjunctions of interaction make up her world, 
not nouns of stasis. 
Kate Millet also strives for that world of interaction: 
[Hler life overflows the narrow, restrictive syntactic 
boundaries of the conventional sentence that is 'a complete 
thought,' bcause there are no 'complete thoughts', as our 
moments touCh moments in other lives, as the places of 
touching are not 'places' but interfaces from which other 
possibilities come into being with their own touchings 
beyond our own. (P&W, 130) 
since they've been my source for the literary criticism 
sUbsection of this epistemological analysis of feminism, I'll 
give Penelope and Wolf the wrap-up: 
The natural imagery of growth, proliferation, and evolution 
replaces nature as object and product. Flux is the only 
experience; stasis is impossible. Labels and abstract nouns 
as viable perceptive categories give way to active, process 
verbs.... (1983:137) 
DRUG CULTURE 
The Lesson of Water 
What one values in the game--
lS the play 
Fluid 
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What one values in the form--
is the moment of forming 
Fluid 
What one values in the house--
is the moment of dwelling 
Fluid 
What one values in the heart--
is the beat 
Pulsing 
What one values in the action--
is the timing 
Fluid 
Indeed 
Because you flow like water 
You can neither win nor lose 
Timothy Leary, VI-5 from Psychedelic Prayers After the Tao Te Ching 
In the drug culture's world, air and water overpower earth. 
water flows, preferring process, and air allows flight. Both 
strongly oppose the earthbound thingness of the dominant American 
epistemology. Drug language, like poetry and water, prefers 
process. The same verb-preference observed in Navajo, feminism, 
theater, and Hopi repeats itself here: to take drugs is to 'turn 
on', to engage in process. To Timothy Leary, the process is 
paramount; even if during the course of a trip some state of 
consciousness seems particularly appealing, Leary emphatically 
declares the need to continue with the process: "Consciousness 
could flick in and out of any imaginable happy/horror chamber. 
The trick was not to get caught, not to freeze the flow of 
reality" (1983:66). 
Language of journeying a:ccompanies language of process. 
'Launching off', for instance, means to take psychedelic 
mushrooms (psilocybin). Leary speaks of having "shared voyages" 
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(1983:65) with people, which means taking drugs with them. 
An 'inner explorer' is a person who uses psychedelic drugs. 
When you're on drugs, you 'trip', another journey-word. 
The journey-imagery is closely associated with air-imagery. 
'I'm high' is a sUbstitute for 'I'm tripping', and 'high as a 
kite' is another. A third expression used for the same purpose 
is 'flying'. The three metaphorical systems, process, journey 
and air, remain intimately bound. 
These drug expressions do not at all resemble expressions 
used for states of consciousness induced by alcohol, narcotics 
or downers. Words such as 'wasted' connote an association with 
garbage, which usually resides on the ground. 'Fucked-up' 
similarly brings to mind extreme physicality, coming as it does 
from the root fokken, to strike hard with a stick, and meaning 
now to have violent or meaningless sex. 'Plastered' also carries 
associations with physicality, particularly with walls, prime 
examples of bounding. 'Trashed' and 'shitfaced' hearken back to 
'wasted' and an association of excrement and garbage. Finally, 
'smashed', 'bombed', and 'blasted' all produce images of a 
destroyed thing. 
Leary and the drug culture not only use process-language, 
but advocate communitas. His work at a prison while he was still 
a professor at Harvard reveals his emphasis : 
It seemed that two major factors were bringing about changes 
in the convicts: first, the perception of new realities 
helped them recognize that they had alternatives beyond the 
cops and robbers game; then, the empathetic bonding of group 
members helped them sustain their choice of a new life. 
(83:89) 
Leary's summer research institute in Mexico attempted a 
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( 
communitas-based community; he called the people there 
'utopiates' and used the same word to refer to the psychedelic 
drugs. Summing up, he said: "The six weeks at Zihuatanejo had 
given us a glimpse of utopia" (83:143). Turner's observation that 
liminals often attempt to create utopias seems applicable here. 
"Within a few days we realized that we were developing the 
Ultimate-destination resort. Hotel Nirvana .... " Similar 
examples of communitas in the drug culture include the Big House 
Leary set up in Millbrook, a place where everyone could 
come and be equal, and Ken Kesey and his traveling bus. 
Woodstock, among others festivals, springs to mind as an 
epitomizing example of much of the drug culture's communitas-
based epistemology. 
opposition to personal property, as we would expect, goes 
hand-in-hand with communitas. The examples of Kesey's bus and 
Leary's Big House are clear. Leary says "if your concept of 
'real estate' is neurological rather than mammalian, then your 
habitat defines your launching pad." This statement may seem 
somewhat packed, but seen in the light of his clear preference 
for neurological over mammalian (which he perceives as 
territorial, property-oriented), Leary seems to be advocating 
that we define our reality in neurological and not thingbound 
terms. If you follow a self-created reality, he believes, you 
have a launching pad from which you can journey through the air, 
away from this bounded territorial mammalian earth ground of 
structure and property. 
Leary's belief in the creatability of reality derives from 
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his experience with LSD. During a part of the tripper's 
experience, she is entirely able to re-imprint herself, to 
prepare an altered reality for herself for the time when she 
emerges from the trip. "consciousness," he says, "is energy 
received by structure" (1966) which sounds very similar to 
Turner's notion of communitas as a structure-refresher. Except 
that Leary draws radically different conclusions: he sees the 
liminal stage as a way to change, not just reaffirm the old 
structure, to re-im-print, not just re-in-vigorate. For Leary, 
the liminal stage is more than structure's refreshments stand. 
After a good trip, Leary says, "Your old reality fades a bit, and 
you incorporate a new reality" (1983:87). For Leary that's 
what change is all about, a new creating, not a steady state 
pendulum determining our kneejerk reactions to the last era. 
I'll let Leary have the last words here: 
I have remained unenthusiastic about pious teachers who set 
up schools, hierarchies, and special rituals •.. [We should] 
avoid secrecy, beaurocracy, masters, followers, dogma, and 
fixed ritual ••. make accessible to everyone what had for 
centuries been shrouded in occultism. (83:150) 
* * * 
In the final analysis theater comes closest to an example of 
Turner's liminal model. The elements of sacredness, the present-
tenseness, the emphasis on simplicity, the total obedience, the 
no-self complex and the communitas-inspired ensemble seem to 
slide in toto from Turner's list of liminal attributes into the 
repertory of modern, institutionalized liminals doing on a 
societal level what the ritual stage once did on an individual 
level: reversing, refreshing, questioning. 
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The only tight spot in the otherwise perfect fit proves to 
be theater's (unexpected to Turner) preoccupation with 'creating 
reality' on stage, a preoccupation that pops up again in modern 
physics. Creating reality, as Heisenberg, Wheeler et al point 
out, is the prime occupation of every physicist. 
Furthermore, physics fits into the process-epistemology 
model, emphasizing no-thing-ness, process and interactions. But 
instead of being the expected marginal/inferiors, they're the 
structural superiors, institutionalized science's top echelon of 
epistemological inquirers. Antibounding this time finds its home 
near the top. 
And also near the bottom where feminists, whose gender is 
often called 'airy', 'flighty', or 'spacey' (airnames all) soar 
into the world of process, recognizing their marginality and 
seeking to infuse the dominant culture with their own distinctive 
aesthetic and underlying epistemology. Focusing on wholeness, 
communality and present-tenseness, they know all along that they 
seek to change the dominant epistemology. 
As does the drug culture, whose loud opposition to 
structure and property and admiration for communitas was coupled 
with a clear cognizance of the liminal re-imprinting process. 
That knowledge found expression in the belief in the createdness 
of reality, a belief that the drug culture shares with feminism 
and physics, Gehlen and Geertz. 
The createdness of reality is a crucial point. If you 
create reality, you need not be bound by some previously 
demarcated steady state. Epistemology, that is to say, need not 
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always accompany social structure. If reality is created, 
process-epistemology can pop up anywhere: at Princeton in the form 
of string theory, at Oberlin with the rotating chair, in the 
White House with psilocybin (see Leary 1983). Turner's model, by 
contrast, insists on the unchangable steady-state, the land where 
structure determines thing-epistemology and anti-structure 
determines process-epistemology. 
Looking back, Yinger's model of evolutionary change does 
seem far more suited than Turner's steady state pendulum to these 
four groups. 3 Each of the four, particularly physics, feminism 
and the drug culture, seems something of a mutation, a change on 
the symbol-level world of the chromosome. Whether the mutation's 
ultimate success would lead to species extinction or perfection, 
to an over-armored dinosaur or an adaptable chameleon, remains 
uncertain. 
What is certain is that the mutation can change the 
organism, create a new symbolic world. Process-epistemology 
sometimes rules the roost. Navajo preference, like feminsm's, 
rests (or doesn't rest) on motion, on the air end and the verb. 
Hopi, like the drug culture, flows in process, in the 
epistemological system that Turner associates with liminality but 
that in more than one culture inhabits the world of the 
dominants. And even when the dominant culture does hold a 
radically thingish epistemology, as in America, members of a 
3Just a thought: a steady state, a demarcated field--bounded 
entities, things. An evolution, an endless evolving--a process, 
without bounds. Is my own bias determining my model? 
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structurally superior group can hold a process epistemology, as 
the American physicists who are currently reformulating the face 
of science show. Each group, then, advocating a slightly 
different twist from the dominant thing-epistemology, represents 
a unique counter, a distinct mutation fighting to control the 
symbolic code of the cultural DNA. 
cultural contradiction, opposition, ambiguity: the tools for 
digging deeper, for finding out what holds the culture up, say 
Schneider, Turner and Yinger. Following Basso's (1979) 
distinction, I'll leave the 'interpretive' (or symbolic) models 
behind and push on into the 'social' models; say arrivaderci to 
the 'thick description' of local happenings and begin to search 
out the social ambiguities, the use and abuse of 'reality' by the 
individuals themselves. In other words: Goodbye America, Hello 




CHAPTER 5: riverrun1 
If the last chapter was the game handbook, this one is a 
strategist's guide, a showing of the game films to the players 
themselves. No game, no matter how complicated, can be 
appreciated or even understood with a knowledge of only the 
rules; the strategy, the why's of this feint and that attack, 
represents the beauty of the game and holds the conscious 
attention of the players. 
The rules themselves, of course, do not always form a 
seamless whole, a simple mandate of practices for a single 
purpose. Rules evolve in response to various requirements--the 
promotion of excitement, for instance, coupled with the 
inhibition of violence. Some of the rules are born of the need 
to promote that excitement, some out of the need to inhibit that 
violence, and bound they may hold together as a coherent system. 
Players, brought up under the mediating set of ,rules, may believe 
that the game they play is actually a manifestation of one of the 
needs, not both: one hockey player may emphasize grace, and one 
violence. Who chooses what depends on a bookload of variables, 
lLiterary/Philosophic footnote: 
James Joyce's Finnegan's Wake. 
is uncapitalized because there 
comes in context. 
'riverrun' 
The general 
really is no 
is the first word of 
consensus is that it 
beginning; everything 
Literature, of course, is itself both a process of bounding 
and creating, as Joyce's choice of the uncapitalized first word 
shows. Something is always left out. Joyce was an exception. 
Most who draw broad distinction between the art/humanities and 
the sciences tend to think of the former as essentially creative 
and the latter as essentially bounding, i.e., demarcating 
significant facts for analysis. But as I have tried to show, 
every endeavor must needs contain both. Literature often claims 
to be purely creative; chemistry to be purely analytic 
(bounding); I hope that anthropology comes to do and admit both. 
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everything from town of birth and coaches to individual 
personality and role in the game. 
And even after you pick your place in the game, or rather 
your circumstances and you pick it together, dilemmas pop up. 
What if the game interferes with your religion? What if you 
can't stay married and be on the road a hundred and eighty days a 
year? What if you have to sleep with somebody, or get involved 
in some shady dealings? These are the times that try men's 
souls. 
We are, of course, the players, and the American thing-
epistemology is our game. The strategies we use to play by or 
around or against the rules come to be somewhat standardized; 
since the game remains pretty much the same, many of our tactics 
become canonized. Whoever heard of playing football without a 
down-and-out? But the strategies reflect not only the make-up of 
the game; to some extent they also reflect the way we'd like the 
game to be. And just as changes come about in the rules of games 
when those very rules come into conflict with other 'games' in 
the society, so our strategies can either reflect or reform the 
dominant epistemology. Prohibition isn't always permanent, but 
the weight of the law can come down hard. 
On then to the strategies: the contextual use and abuse, by 
social actors, of our conceptual rules for the thing-reality. 
* * * 
To me, writing on a computer isn't 'really' writing. To you, 
voting socialist isn't a 'real' alternative. But a book can come 
100 
off a computer and a socialist candidate can collect votes. 
Living on a kibbutz isn't a 'real' lifestyle and academia isn't 
'the real world', but thousands of people live on kibbutzes and 
millions live in academia. Why then do we use the word 'real' in 
these contexts? Quite simply, we use the word 'real' to define 
reality on our terms, to limit the frame of discouse to our size 
frame. If I don't like your haircut, I'll tell you to get a 
'real' haircut. In my reality, contextually defined, your 
haircut is so far from the norm that it doesn't deserve to be 
called 'haircut'. 
A splash of graffitti on the wall of a dormitory at Drew 
University illustrates the concept well: "Reality is for people 
who can't handle drugs." As a tactical shot in this game, that's 
true. People who don't want to 'handle' drugs define them as 
outside of reality so that they don't have to handle them. Of 
course it works the other way too: members of the drug culture, 
feeling alienated from the dominant thing ish conception of 
reality, redefine reality as something that only an unable non-
user would want anyway. Tactical shot number two. But trying to 
pull away from either perspective, it becomes clear that a brain 
is just as 'real' (whatever I mean by that) whether chemically-
induced synapses are firing or not. 
Advertising provides a rich field for the analysis of social 
strategy in the reality game. Coke, for instance, is 'the real 
thing', and by rather pointed implication no other colas are. 
Beef is 'real food for real people', which means either other 
possible nourishments are so far from food that they don't 
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deserve the label or people who eat them aren't quite people, or 
both. 'Real' vanilla is defined by a standards agency as the 
specific part of the plant from which vanilla is derived, but 
exact chemical duplicates from other parts or other plants must 
be labeled 'imitation'. Milk is defined as the secretion from a 
cow's udders plus certain other chemicals, but if different (not 
the specified other) chemicals are used a dairy may not use the 
insignia 'REAL'. The same with mayonnaise: Miracle Whip must 
call its product 'salad dressing' because its chemicals are not 
in accord with a set of guidelines defining 'real' mayonnaise. 
In all of these cases, reality is defined as that which is within 
the advertiser or standardizer's interests. Coke is real and 
Pepsi isn't, because Coke decides. 
contemporary idioms pave the same path. 'Get real' means 
get like me; your ideas or actions are straying far enough from 
(my) reality that they're nonsense. Or it means something like 
'unreal', which expresses disbelief, but more importantly, 
removes the surprising event from the realm of the suprising into 
the realm of the unreal and so negates the necessity of 
interpreting it. 'It's been real' says what we just had was good 
and deep and important. 'Get a real ' as in haircut or job 
or meal, defines reality once more on the speaker's terms; the 
addressee's haircut or job or proposed meal is not real, and if 
she wants to think of herself as being clean, employed and fed, 
she'd better get real. If the idioms I heard when I was a 
vegetarian were true in any actual sense, then I spent that part 
of my life eating plastic apples and glass eggs, because I was 
constantly implored to 'eat something real'. 
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Two non-idiomatic forms of the word 'real' work in much the 
same way. 'Realize' means to understand--to make real for an 
individual; or to get profits--to make potential money into real 
money. Remember a 'real' once meant a king and a coin. 
'Really' is used as an intensifier, similarly to 'very' or 
'truly'. Not all languages, of course, intensify by insisting 
on actuality. In America we social strategists say 'really 
hungry', but in Hebrew, for instance, you'd say the equivalent of 
'hungry hungry', and if you were really really hungry you'd say 
hungry hungry hungry. In English English you'd say 'quite 
hungry' (and maybe 'chap'), quite coming from 'quietus,' Latin 
for 'fixed' or 'quiet'. Significantly, Americans intensify 
descriptions by insisting on their realities. Even the two other 
primary intensifiers--'very' and 'truly'--derive from words about 
reality. 'Very' comes from the Latin 'veritas' which meant 
'truth' and 'truly' comes from the same root in English. 
Art and entertainment provide more fodder for the analytic 
cannon. A line of a poem by Nikki Giovanni springs to 
mind: "Because what's real is really real." In order to affirm 
that she can be both an advocate of feminist Black power and an 
unabashed fan of men in tight pants, Ms. Giovanni feels compelled 
to insist three times (no casual three: as a poet, her words are 
preciously chosen) that both her desires are real. Neither one 
is beyond the range of discourse, even though Black feminism 
commonly excludes tight pants-lovers and tight pants-lovers 
commonly exclude feminists. Both are real, Giovanni proclaims, 
and can be real together. 
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Giovanni doesn't stand alone in the art world in defining 
reality. A recent production of an original production here at 
Oberlin College contained a monologue on rap music that 
emphatically declared that rap is 'real music for real people'. 
Reacting to a local environment in which a White conservatory 
sets the cultural standards for what constitutes 'real' music, a 
Black artist attempted to bring his music and his people back 
within the domain of the 'real'. 
Recent television's weekly Real People show, although less 
stirring, provides an equally pertinent example of artistic 
frame-setting: reacting to a society that harbors at-least 
occasional doubts as the the 'real-ness' of television 
characters, the network decided not to use trained actors for the 
show, and chose to highlight this fact by calling the people 
'real'. An actor might argue that even actors are real people, 
but when the network is defining reality, no one's listening. 
Direct ethnography (often called 'eavesdropping' in 
autoanthropology) provides some of the most direct examples. A 
friend of mind who works in psychological counseling once told me 
about a personal emotional trauma that was in the process of 
ending her marriage. After describing the emotional ins and 
outs, she responded to a question I asked about future vocational 
plans by saying "I've been taking life one day at a time ... I 
haven't had time for the real world, real life." By setting her 
own emotional world and the 'real' world in opposition, she 
implicitly defined her emotional traumas as unreal. In so doing, 
she lessened the intensity of their impact. 
Another friend described the attempts of a clinic she worked 
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with to redefine their image: 
I had to go out and get ~ real haircut, real clothes. This 
clinic has, I guess, a radical lesbian feminist image, so we 
dress ... you know, for real ... No Birkenstocks, no beads, no 
long hair. 
Real haircuts and real clothes are the ones that a radical 
lesbian feminist does not wear, a feminist social worker feels 
compelled to say, adopting the tactics of the mainstream as her 
own. 
* * * 
Why? Why do NBC and a radical feminist both argue by 
framing discourse, whether that discourse is framed towards or 
against them? The rules of the game are clear, reality is thing, 
but why does our culture mandate (suggest? require?) framing a 
disagreement by determining the range of discourse. Coke could 
say 'the best thing' as easily as 'the real thing'; you could say 
'I don't like quiche' as easily as 'real men don't eat quiche'; I 
could say I'm 'quite' hungry. But we don't. Instead, we create 
(or play with or strategize or define or manipulate) our reality. 
The giant 'why' returns to the discussion of the rules of 
the game, Chapter 2. REALITY IS A THING predisposes American 
conceptions towards an objectivist account of the universe, 
towards the perception of a singular, absolutely true answer to 
each question. 
A series of single, absolutely true answers makes up one big 
single, absolute reality. And an absolute reality admits no 
dissent. If you and I disagree, we can't both be right. Either 
a particle is there or it isn't. Theatrical characters are real 
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or they aren't. Real estate is territorial or mammalian. A 
woman's name is 'inside woman' or 'cave woman', not both. A 
single reality, made up of a long list of Newtonian knowable 
truths, stops arguments in its tracks. How can you disagree with 
what is? 
* * * 
But American culture and society demands argument. Our 
legal system is based fundamentally on the belief that argument 
leads the way to understanding. Even our most hardened criminals 
are given the right to argue their cases, and the attorney who 
defends them is not sullied by their crime; to the contrary, a 
courtroom defense lawyer remains a hihgly valued position in 
I American culture. , 
Similarly, our political system founds itself on the 
assumption of the value of vigorous debate. Not only elections, 
but the very system of governing itself works through the 
sometimes furious exchange of opinions. The foundations of our 
modern state, the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution, strongly assert not only the right, but the 
necessity of argument in the creation of a state. The democratic 
tradition and the philosophy of social freedom formulated by 
Thomas Jefferson and his contemporaries states that all opinions 
are valid, that a free and open discourse lies at the heart of a 
morally good society. 
And those Jefferson-inspired sentiments remain operative 
today. The united States is one of the few nations in the world 
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in which both Nazi and Communist parties operate freely. The 
recent nomination of Judge Bork to the Supreme Court was assailed 
for, among other reasons, his refusal to support the right of 
radical revolutionaries to call for an armed uprising against the 
government. Obviously the freedom of opinion is respected. 
Those who do not oppose censorship are those whose 
religious subcultures have most strongly cosmos-ized their nomos 
(see Berger), those who assert their own rightness and 
righteousness as the will of God first and America second. They 
have validated their thing-epistemology as the absolute, 
unassailable will of an absolute, unassailable God. 
For the rest of us in American culture though, censorship is 
seen as a grave wrong. Whenever we or our press talks about 
oppressive regimes in the rest of the world, we cite instances of 
rigged elections, and significantly, censorship of the press. 
The growing admiration of Americans for Mikhail Gorbachev derives 
in no small part from his loosing the reins on press control and 
political dissidence. And back home, the Scopes Monkey trial 
stands as a hallmark of American culture, having generated books, 
movies, and the career of at least one cultural hero. 
These two cultural symbols, then, reflect an inherent 
tension in American culture. On the one hand stands objective 
truth, REALITY IS A THING, representing the belief in a singular 
unassailable truth. On the other hand stands the notion of open 
discourse, the belief in the right and necessity of a pluralist 
community of opinions. 
So how do we sit on both sides of the fence at once? It's 
the baseball player faced with breaking up: how do you tow the 
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line between career and marriage? On the one hand, our 'game' 
demands a dissent-rebuking singular absolute reality. On the 
other hand, a key cultural symbol, democracy, demands the 
opposite. Which one goes, marriage or job? 
Neither, of course. Our strategy walks the tight rope, 
keeps us in good with the wife and the boss. It is the 
manipulation of reality on a day-to-day level that mediates 
between these two opposing cultural notions. The only way to 
remove an opinion from the range of discourse without incurring 
the negative labelling of 'censor' is to define the opinion as 
outside the realm of objective, fixed reality. I still don't 
like your haircut, but I know you as an American have the right 
to wear it, so I define it as outside the realm of the 
essentialist definition of 'haircut' within the objective 
reality. That way I'm no censor, but the haircut's got to go. 
But we have met the enemy and he is us. To preserve the 
fixed, objective reality, to keep playing the game, we adopt the 
hallmark tactical move of the process-epistemology, the creation 
of reality. We redefine reality, create a new meaning for quiche 
and food and men. 
On the level of practice the split epistemologies begin to 
merge. My separate categories blend out of separateness into a 
single new structure: the structure of the tactics. Each 
American, faced with the contradictions and ambiguities of a 
culture that contains thing and process elements, develops a 
coping strategy. Process-tactics, like creating reality, are 
used by thing-ers to maintain the thing-system. And thing-
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tactics, like the feminist clinic worker's invocation of real 
clothes and haircuts, are used by process-ers. Aristotle uses 
Galileo and Galileo uses Aristotle. 
This is no simple story of the genius of American 
cooptation, no smug smile or sad gaze at Eldredge Cleaver voting 
Republican or hearing the Grateful Dead in harmony at the 
supermarket. This is a story of double-effect: of actors from 
both sides of the fence sitting on it and taking what they need 
from where they need it. Of process affecting thing and thing 
affecting process. Of the context evolving--the mutation 
affecting the organism and the organism affecting the mutation. 
Of horse and turf together. Which could seem to hearken back to 
Turner's steady-state model but doesn't, because individuals in 
this modern era are confronted by nonstopchange, by inventions, 
discoveries, immigrants, theories, and technologies. The use of 
the old methods to deal with the new problems doesn't always 
work. 
As Sahlins has recently said, using traditional strategies 
on new (outside) phenomena may not produce the expected results; 
the new inventionsdiscoveriesimmigrantstheoriestechnologies may 
have their own ways of responding. Change, then, may result from 
the failed attempt to reenforce the game through the use of 
traditional strategy (Sahlins 198x in Ortner 198x). Whites 
changed the Sandwich Islanders, the plow changed our ancestors, 
the television and the computer are changing us. 
So the growing influence of process on thing in our daily 
strategies, the tempering of Aristotle with Galileo, may grow 
from the new inventionsdiscoveriesimmigrantstheoriestechnologies 
109 
( 
with which we have recently been confronted. psilocybin, for 
instance, seems not to care whether you prefer thing-game 
preserving tactics. Like the plow, it organizes not only social 
relations but ways of thinking and seeing the world--
epistemologies. And photons and the electroweak force don't care 
if you and I would prefer a clockwork Newtonian world. We can 
try over and over again (and Einstein did) to find ways around 
the experiments, to apply our time-tested tactics of thinghood. 
But the waves keep waving, and waving through no-thing at that. 
* * * 
We know the tactics are changing, that individual Americans 
are coming to use that distinguishing mark of process, the 
creation of reality, as a prime tactic. Idioms with 'real' in 
them are very recent phenomena; so are advertisements that tell 
us what's real and what isn't. And even the use of 'really' as 
an intensifier, although with us in a minor form since 
Shakespeare, has only lately come to be the prime usage. 2 
But are the rules changing with the tactics? Is the game 
being altered? It seems like the answer is yes. Physics's 
apparently 'counter' epistemology comes from the top of the 
structure; individual physicists's tactics for adapting to the 
new discoveries have led to the transformation of physic's way of 
seeing the world. That in turn has seeped down into biology, 
cognitive science and psychology, and even literary theory, 
philosophy and art. Could John Cheever or Northrop Frye have 
2See the definition rankings in A.H.D., Webster's, and Q.E.D. 
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existed before Einstein? 
'Change' has become one of the rallying cries of American 
culture. Not yet as loud as 'truth' or 'objective reality', but 
getting louder all the time. We emphasize the process of 
changing, shaking our heads one way or the other at the way they 
took down old Uncle Ed's farm and put the condos up. And we've 
even begun to teach change--mandating 'Life cycle' classes as 
part of the health curriculum in public high schools,3 
emphasizing now those parts of our lives which manifest process. 
We have even begun to talk about 'the invention of tradition' in 
history, realizing that even what seemed most static--tradition--
is itself a part of process. 
But I don't want to go too far. I only want to suggest that 
we are beginning to change, to proceed into the world of process, 
to recognize the significance of form as well as function. 
Postmodernism implicitly recognizes the significance of seeing 
both process and thing. The thing being analyzed, the content, 
is generally considered to hold the privileged position in 
academia. But postmodernism attempts to balance thing and 
process by saying the form of the analyzing is as imnportant as 
what is analyzed. The telling is as important as what is told. 
If I teach you democracy in a dictatorial classroom, I send mixed 
messages at best, and at worst undermine the very subject I am 
attempting to pass on. The teaching matters as much as what is 
taught, process as much as thing. 
Anthropology has not been entirely immune from the general 
American drift towards a more evenly balanced epistemological 
3As in New Jersey, for instance, my home state. 
system. 4 The classic style of the monograph, for instance, has 
come under increasing scrutiny. victor Turner has pleaded that 
anthropology become "something more than a cognitive game played 
in our heads and inscribed in--let's face it--somewhat tedious 
journals" (1982:101). Bateson has called for the necessary 
reunification of what he calls 'mind' and 'nature'. Turner has, 
even more daringly, advocated a technique for teaching 
anthropology that should ring as noticeably process-oriented: 
using ethnographies as playscripts. As he has eloquently and 
accurately put it: 
I've long thought that teaching and learning anthropology 
should be more fun than they are .... Alienated students spend 
many tedious hours in library carrels struggling with 
accounts of alien lives and even more alien anthropological 
theories about the ordering of those lives. Whereas 
anthropology should be about, in D.H. Lawrence's phrase, 
"man alive" and "woman alive," this living quality 
frequently fails to emerge from our pedagogics, perhaps, to 
cite Lawrence again, because our "analysis presupposes a 
corpse. (82:89) 
Or, as e.e. cummings puts it, "knowledge/ is deadbutnotburied 
imagination." Analysis does presuppose a corpse. The shell of a 
human once the life has left, a corpse is the perfect metaphor 
for a thing without process. Imagination, creativity: these are 
the life-force, the process complement to the thinglike body. 
Our anthropological writing has so consistently drawn its 
inspiration from the thing (analytic bounding) tradition that it 
has neglected the artistic (creative) process epistemology. But 
as America changes, as our epistemology begins to mirror our 
4Although the self-consciousness one would expect to accompany 
the drift has been noticeably absent. 
112 
( 
practice-level juggling act of thing and process, our writing 
begins to appear to us as more and more of a rigid structure, an 
incomplete picture. Counting chickens and analyzing kinship 
isn't enough anymore; we want creation--a portrait of a culture's 
lifeblood, or at least a good read. The telling is beginning to 
be recognized alongside the what-is-told. 
But our literary rigidness engenders more than bored 
anthropologists. Our traditional literary genre plugs into one 
half of our increasingly dual epistemology: the thing half. By 
aligning our 'telling' with that epistemology, we may alienate 
our 'what-is-told'. Take my section on feminism, for instance. 
It represents a classically anthropological approach, an analysis 
clearly steeped in traditional writing style. As such, I tied 
myself strongly into the thing-epistemology, into the analytic 
bounding and structure. 
But is that fair to feminism? Have I stepped outside of the 
insider's point of view and taken refuge in my own conventions 
and traditions? Geertz's revolutionary call for understanding 
from the native's point of view builds from an assumption that we 
can most readily comprehend a culture through its own categories, 
that their way of making sense out of the world is far more 
likely to be revealed by their internal orderings than by our 
external, imposed orderings. By relegating feminism's process-
epistemology to nothing more than an object of study within my 
analytic approach and write-up, I have denied them their autonomy 
as an epistemological system. And by denying them their autonomy 
I have put on my blinders, relegated them to a less-than-full 
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position and myself to a less-than-full understanding. 
It has become acceptable to say that our own cultural 
rUbrics do not necessarily apply cross-culturally, that 
'religion' might not be a useful device for describing Chinese 
civilization and that 'kinship' might not help in Yap. As 
schneider has shown (1985), the use of our rubrics to analyze 
others may teach us more about ourselves than others, although we 
may continue to think we're learning about the others. More 
recently, Charles Briggs (1986) has shown that as we come to 
accept Schneider's tenets, our hegemonic theories have been 
pushed underground into the realm of methodology. Our ways of 
finding out about alien cultures reflect "our theories of 
communication and of social reality" (p.120). Our reliance on 
those local, folk categories, he says, 
acts as a hidden filter, blocking our ability to hear what 
'they' are saying while allowing the comforting sound of our 
own preconceptions about language and life to be echoed in 
our data. (p.125) 
As long as we continue to assume the universality of our cultural 
categories or folk methodologies we are doomed to never 
understand others as they understand themselves. 
In the end, it's our desire to extend our own relevance that 
snaps back on us. As Geertz has said: 
To see ourselves as others see us can be eye-opening. 
To see others as sharing a nature with ourselves is the 
merest decency. But it is from the far more difficult 
achievement of seeing ourselves amongst others, as a local 
example of the forms human life has locally taken, a case 
among cases, a world among worlds, that the largeness of 
mind, without which objectivity is self-congratulation and 
tolerance a sham, comes. (1983:16) 
Schneider's critique has only begun to be seriously heeded. 
Briggs's still echoes unheard, a challenge ringing from the far-
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away land of sociolinguistics. While Briggs's challenge travels 
at the speed of sound across that great divide, I'll offer 
another from my even more distant place. Not only do our 
analytic rubrics and ethnographic methods often cast a filter 
between us and our object: our very method of communicating with 
ourselves inside academia distorts whatever it is we may have 
seen through those filtered rubrics and methods. By writing in a 
static, analytic style we impose an epistemology that may be 
alien to the very people we study. 
Penelope and Wolf, for instance, the major source for my 
analysis of literary feminism, themselves regret the necessity of 
writing in a style that alienates some of the very women they are 
trying to reach. The alienation will contine, they say, 
As long as there is a 'prestige dialect' that everyone 
aspiring to status is expected to acquire, and as long as 
publishers, editors, and reviewers sanction only those works 
written in the prestige dialect.... (1983:138n) 
Their understanding of the links between language and 
epistemology (detailed earlier) renders their statement powerful: 
they are expected to adjust to the dominant epistemology before 
they are taken seriously. 
I have been complicit, from a different angle, in their 
cooptation. I have tried to understand feminist epistemology in 
an epistemology alien to the very one I study. Like imposing 
biogenetic kinship on the Yap or referential-content interviewing 
on Mexicanos, I have constructed a wall of my own assumptions 
between myself and my subject. 
Schneider showed that the assumption that kinship deals with 
human reproduction has clouded our understanding of Yap. Briggs 
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showed that the assumption that interviewing is a culturally-
neutral device has led to misunderstanding Mexicano culture. Now 
I point out that the assumption that journal and monograph 
writing should follow a distinctive style "modeled rather 
abjectly on those of the natural sciences" (Turner 1983:89) has 
led to our misunderstanding those cultures or subcultures that 
eschew a thing-epistemology. 
Or even, as I have shown, supplement a thing-epistemology 
with a process-epistemology, such as ours. Wouldn't anthropology 
seem more 'alive' (Lawrence via Turner) if our writing embodied 
both halfs of our way of seeing the world? As much as we have 
come to alienate and marginalize others by assuming an extended 
importance for our folk beliefs and traditional ways, we have 
come to alienate ourselves by focusing on only half of our own 
beliefs and ways. If we grow to learn the utility of both, we 
may be less likely to misunderstand and alienate others, and more 
likely to understand and enjoy ourselves. 
* * * 
Such a proposal by no means exceeds the range of the 
possible. We have within our communicative repertoire a number 
of methods that do not exclude process, and some which even 
highlight it. Turner's suggestion for a performative 
anthropology, for instance, might allow us to portray and 
comprehend more process-oriented and liminal groups than the 
current journal style. Annual meetings of mixed paper 
presentations and play performances might provide a more humanly 
fulfilling experience than the current meetings. similarly, 
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journals which encourage creative, playful prose or even 
ethnographic poetry might produce a more balanced understanding 
of others and a greater sense of completeness for ourselves. And 
all of this might have the added attraction of bringing our 
theories and journals back within the grasp of the layperson, 
who seems to have been arbitrarily excluded by a mUltiplying web 
of abstruse terms and dry prose. 5 
Such suggestions are of course only preliminary, pre-limin-
ary, before we enter the liminal structureless stage of 
reformulating ourselves. As we know by now, that stage is the 
imagery-generator, the brainstorming session in which to renew or 
change the structure. It seems most appropriate that only by 
going beyond the pre-limin-ary stage, only by boldly stepping 
forth into the life-and-death of the liminal, can we enter the 
watershed era of ideas, the time when we will create new forms to 
express both elements of our epistemology. 
This paper, then, only points the way towards that day. It 
is process--the pointing--as much as it is product--the paper. 
If I have not yet followed the dual form of writing that I 
advocate, I can only echo Penelope and Wolf, to say for now that 
I must work at least within earshot of the 'prestige dialect', 
the prestige epistemology. within that earshot, though, I have 
done what I could to keep audible both halfs of our epistemology, 
5To the argument that we can't expect our senior anthropologists 
to don costumes and wade through poetry, I can only respond by 
saying that 'real anthropologists don't mind a bumpy road'. 
Anthropology has always cherished that versatile, rough-and-ready 
image among academics, and a little physical theater and 
spiritual poetry would only add an eccentric twist to the Indiana 
Jones image. 
117 
to balance system with practice, steady state with change, 
playful prose with standard analytic writing, in order to present 
the American epistemology from the insider's point of view. 
Because I am an insider, an individual acting on the level 
of practice. I am the cultural actor, using both halfs of the 
dual epistemology--thing and process--in a strategic attempt to 
define my reality of America. As one native to another, I'll 
conclude on a familiar note. This paper, my strategic attempt, 
is a thing, certainly. You hold it in your hands, a bounded 
discrete object. But it is also a process, a first step in 




The following represents an example of the matched-
epistemology writing style that I advocate. 'It is important to 
note that I do not call for a transformation of all 
anthropological writing, merely that which attempts to describe 
cultures or subcultures with epistemologies radically different 
from our own. The following section on the drug culture, for 
instance, would stand side-by-side with the standard analytic 
style used in Chapter 2. See Chapter 5 for a more detailed 
explanation of why I propose this, and how I feel it would 
improve in one fell sweep the anthropological enterprise's 
understanding and enjoyment, as well as contribute to current 
trends in de-imperializing our methodologies and theories. 
This section can be compared against the more conventional 
section included in the body of Chapter 4. 
DRUG CULTURE 1 
The Lesson of Water 
What one values in the game--
is the play 
Fluid 
What one values in the form--
is the moment of forming 
Fluid 
What one values in the house--
is the moment of dwelling 
Fluid 
What one values in the heart--
is the beat 
Pulsing 
IThere are contrarytowhatyoumightthink no spacing problems or 
typos in this section. 
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What one values in the action--
is the timing 
Fluid 
Indeed 
Because you flow like water 
You can neither win nor lose 
Timothy Leary, VI-5 from Psychedelic Prayers After the Tao Te Ching 
Air and water overpower earth. Water flows, process proceeds, 
air allows flight. Drug language like poetry prefers process. 
"[W]e all launched off" (Leary [after L] 1983:65) means we took 
mushrooms together means we added psilocybin to ourselves. We 
"shared voyages" (IBID) means we took drugs with. We turn on; 
Leary was the first "to turn on Robert Lowell" (L 83:67) which 
means he gave him shrooms. We verb, always action process like a 
journey. "Ralph turned out to be a natural inner explorer" 
(83:85) Leary said, flashing back. He turned out to be a natural 
inner explorer, but we turn Qn, tune in, drop out says Leary, 
always process always turning tuning dropping never really there. 
Flowing is water and flying is air. We get high and we trip, 
journey and air, never ground. I'm flying I say which means I'm 
more than high which means I'm not on or concerned with this 
thinglike structure ground. sometimes I'm even high as a kite. 
And when I'm flying I might be tripping too, always a journey but 
an air or waterflow journey. 
This is not like drinking. When I drink I'm wasted which is 
thingarbage usually on the ground or fucked-up which means 
etymologically to strike hard with a stick fokken and now means 
to have violent or meaningless sex a very physical act or I'm 
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plastered very house propertylike on a wall something bounding 
or I'm shit faced which is waste on my face which is the ground 
and nogood or I'm smashed which means I'm in pieces and was 
once a thing. Which is all very different from airjourneying. 
Airjourneying is very flow like the poem before and a little 
like this writing and maybe Timothy Leary says it best again when 
he talks about making sure the process never stops even when 
consciousness seems really good "Consciousness could flick in 
and out of any imaginable happy/horror chamber. The trick was 
not to get caught, not to freeze the flow of reality" (1983:66 
who cares when or where). And in another time place Leary said 
that "Psychedelic poetry, like all psychedelic art, is crucially 
concerned with flow" (1966:no page numbers in this book read the 
whole thing not just a quote). 
The whole thing (I know you read the parentheses) like 
communitas like Turner like holism like what my friend said 
taking drugs is he said "holism--a dismantling of the 
bifurcation" and Leary tried to make holism-communitas. Like at 
a prison where he worked when he was with Harvard still he said 
he needed to unbound to make communitas to dismantle the 
bifurcation like my friend said to see beyond the arbitrary way 
of seeing we have 
It seemed that two major factors were bringing about changes 
in the convicts: first, the perception of new realities 
helped them recognize that they had alternatives beyond the 
cops and robbers game [look that's unboundingj; then, the 
empathetic bonding of group members helped them sustain 
their choice of a new life [look that's communitasj. (83:89) 
And other places Leary aimed for communitas like the giant summer 
research institute camp he made in Mexico "The six weeks at 
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Zihuatanejo had given us a glimpse of utopia" (83:143) and Turner 
said that liminals often findcreate utopias at least in their 
minds which is where Leary wants it to be anyway and he even 
calls the group down there in Mexico 'utopiates' and also calls 
the psychedelic (not heroindownerscocainealcohol) drugs the same 
word 'utopiates' and he also said that down in Zihuatenejo 1963 
"Within a few days we realized that we were developing the 
ultimate-destination resort. Hotel Nirvana .... " which reminds 
the reader who is looking for communitas of the Big House he 
later set up in Millbrook which was a place where everyone could 
come and be equal and flow and no one owned any property there 
because property like Turner says is structure and they 
weren't like that up there at Millbrook and neither was Ken Kesey 
and his West coast very different communitas gang that lived for 
a long time in a bus and Leary talking about Millbrook says 
that "if your concept of 'real estate' is neurological rather 
than mammalian, then your habitat defines your launching pad" 
which is pretty complicated but he prefers neurological to 
mammalian which he thinks is territorial and knows the word 
real is in real estate I think so means defining your reality 
in neurological not thingbound terms and if you do your reality 
neurologically then you have a launching pad which means you can 
fly journey and get away from this bounded territorial mammalian 
earth ground of structureproperty 
which he thinks you can do because he thinks you can create 
your reality but not all the time just sometimes, inbetween the 
normal periods of earthbound existence when you take 
psychedelic drugs and give yourself the ability to reimprint 
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yourself 
are you listening victor? to reimprint yourself even 
though you'll go back to the world of imprinted reality and he 
says "Consciousness is energy received by structure" in the book 
with no page numbers (1966) and I think he means when you're 
flying you're off the ground you're liminal but it's not just 
a rest stop for structure it's a way to change it Victor, it's a 
way to re-im-print not just re-in-vigor-ate, a way to change the 
words not just make the old ones strong again 
because like quantum physics and some theater people and 
feminists Leary believes that you can create reality just like 
Berger and Bateson and Geertz and the gang imply and sometimes 
even say 
and if you can create reality then the liminal stage is more 
than a refreshments stand it's an idea land a vacation where 
you learn something not just rest up for work again it's like 
the Jewish Sabbath a time that you learn from and live for and 
hope to bring some of into the world of structure which you enter 
again 
that's what the liminal stage is if you're Timothy Leary or 
a member of the League for Spiritual Discovery and like he says 
"It always works this way after a good trip. Your old reality' 
fades a bit, and you incorporate a new reality" (83:87). Which 
is what change is about, not a steadystate pendulum determining 
our kneejerk reactions to the last era 
et al 
says Leary and physics 
and maybe just maybe the native's point of view is sometimes 
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a little deeper than we'd like it to be especially if the 
native is our culture's own counter and that depth of theirs is 
digging right under the very ground we stand on thing. 
and finally (where I put it) Timothy Leary makes very clear 
how he fits right into that whole Turner liminal Gestalt 
(although he disagrees (and so do I) radically about the 
implications of that on actual cultural social epistemological 
change) by knocking structure and closed morality and status and 
inequality (Turner's terms all) as he does here in his section's 
last words which he deserves 
I have remained unenthusiastic about pious teachers who set 
up schools, hierarchies, and special rituals ... [We should] 
avoid secrecy, beaurocracy, masters, followers, dogma, and 
fixed ritual ... make accessible to everyone what had for 
centuries been shrouded in occultism. (83:150) 
* * * 
and this isn't a part of Leary's drug chapter so I kept my word, 
it's just a little note that I think deserves more than a foot or 
to be booted to the bottom, or kicked around, etc. 
and that note is that I think the section on the drug culture had 
more to say than the section on feminism and I think a lot of that 
had to do with form and postmodernism is not dead. which is to 
say that Geertz is not dead because function here is to relate 
insider'S form and the best way to do that may be to follow 
insider's form 
By trying both I allow the reader to choose, to follow the 
process of this paper instead of automatically assuming that it 
is a bounded, completed thing. I offer the process of revision 
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rather than the revised product, which in and of itself 
represents a very feminist offer. And I democratize style: that 
is, I write in more than one way, and denigrate none of them, 
another trick in the feminist book. 'Epistemology' may be my 
next word, or 'fly journey', because to provide less of a choice 
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